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Foreword: 
Urban Divergence under          
Neoliberalism 
Raymond Hinnebusch 
In	  2011,	  Syria	  descended	  into	  crisis,	  an	  uprising	  against	  the	  regime	  which,	   arguably,	   was	   a	   manifestation	   of	   its	   unbalanced	   version	   of	  authoritarian	   upgrading.	   “Authoritarian	   upgrading”	   denotes	   the	  techniques	  by	  which	  formerly	  populist	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	   have	   sought	   to	   retain	   power	  while	  marginalizing	   their	  former	  plebeian	  constituencies	  in	  parallel	  to	  “post-­‐populist”	  policies	  of	   economic	   liberalization,	  privatization	  and	  welfare	   reductions;	   in	  compensation,	  regimes	  sought	  to	  tap	  new	  resources,	  diversify	  their	  constituencies	  and	  re-­‐regulated	  state-­‐society	  relations	  (Heydemann	  2007).	   However,	   what	   has	   since	   become	   clear	   from	   the	   Arab	  Uprising	   is	   that	  corresponding	   to	  each	  short-­‐term	  gain	   for	  regimes	  from	   such	   techniques	   of	   rule	  were	   also	   cumulative	   long	   run	   costs	  that	   have	   led	   to	   the	   overthrow	  of	   presidents	   in	   Egypt	   and	  Tunisia	  and	  collapse	  or	  near	  collapse	  of	  regimes	  in	  Libya	  and	  Yemen,	  with	  a	  similar	  outcome	  possible	  in	  Syria	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	  	  	  Bashar	   al-­‐Asad	   inherited	   an	   authoritarian	   state	   with	   built-­‐in	  vulnerabilities	  which	  he	   set	  about	   “upgrading”:	  The	  need	   to	   trim	  a	  state	   overdeveloped	   on	   declining	   external	   rents	   and	   to	   foster	   the	  private	   sector	   and	   inward	   investment	   required	   a	   restructuring	   of	  the	  regime’s	  social	  base	  away	  from	  its	  initial	  populist	  alliance.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  these	  changes	  were	  inevitable,	  but	  their	  management	  proved	  inadequate.	  While	  Asad	  went	  relatively	  far	  toward	  restructuring	  the	  regime’s	  social	  base	  he	  failed	  to	  undertake	  a	  corresponding	  political	  adaptation.	   The	   overconcentration	   of	   power	   and	   patronage	   in	   the	  ruling	   clan	   debilitated	   the	   clientele	   networks	   that	   connected	   the	  regime	  to	  society	  while	  the	  new	  co-­‐opted	  classes	  were	  not	  politically	  incorporated,	   by,	   for	   example,	   some	   pluralization	   of	   the	   party	  system;	   parallel	   to	   the	   debilitation	   of	   the	   Baath	   party	   which	   had	  connected	   the	   regime	   to	   its	   former	   constituency,	   the	   too	   rapid	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jettisoning	   of	   social	   services	   and	   legal	   protections	   for	   the	   regime’s	  less	   well-­‐off,	   rural	   and	   periphery	   elements	   created	   the	   seeds	   of	  rebellion	  (Hinnebusch	  2012).	  	  Syria’s	  recent	  political	  trajectory	  is	  reflected	  in	  its	  housing	  and	  urban	   policy,	   and	   specifically	   the	   polarization	   between	   the	   luxury	  accommodation	   and	   profit	   opportunities	   for	   the	   new	   rich	   and	   the	  deteriorating	  provision	  for	  the	  lower	  middle	  and	  lower	  classes.	  In	  a	  recent	   article,	   Robert	   Goulden	   used	   urban	   and	   housing	   policy	   to	  trace	   and	   demonstrate	   the	   differential	   changes	   in	   outcomes	   for	  social	   classes	   as	   Syria	  moved	   form	   a	   populist	   to	   post-­‐populist	   era	  (Goulden	   2011).	   The	   1960s-­‐70s	   established,	   he	   argues,	   a	   near	  universal	   provision	   of	   social	   services	   and	   low	   poverty	   rates	   (with	  only	  10%	  under	  the	  ($2/day)	  poverty	  line	  compared	  to	  20%	  for	  the	  region	  and	  40%	  globally);	  over	  this	  period,	  life	  expectancy	  rose	  28%	  and	  literacy	  by	  40%	  while	  infant	  mortality	  fell	  by	  76%.	  	  Reflective	  of	  this	  in	  the	  field	  of	  housing	  was	  the	  near	  absence	  of	  slums.	  Even	  though	  35-­‐50%	  of	  Syria’s	  housing	  is	  informal,	  only	  10%	  of	  Syria’s	  housing	  stock	  was	  rated	  by	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  as	  slum	  housing	  compared	  to	  40%	  in	  Egypt,	  44%	  in	  Iran	  and	  50%	  in	  Lebanon	  (UN-­‐Habitat	   2003).	   Since	   poverty	   was	   shallow,	   most	   squatters	   could	  afford	   to	   build	   acceptable	   quality	   housing	   (from	   sturdy	   material,	  usually	  concrete	  blocks)	  and,	  although	  illegal,	  informal	  communities	  were	   connected	   to	   many	   utilities	   and	   by	   law	   could	   only	   be	  demolished	   if	   alternative	   housing	   was	   provided.	   In	   2008	   formal	  property	  rights	  began	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  some	  of	  this	  housing	  stock.	  A	  housing	  crisis	  became	  apparent	  in	  the	  2000	  although	  it	  roots	  go	   back	   some	   way.	   Decline	   in	   the	   welfare	   state	   began	   in	   the	   late	  1980s.	  The	  population	  boom	   far	  exceeded	   the	  modest	  provision	  of	  public	   housing,	  which	  was	   hugely	   oversubscribed.	   Private	   owners,	  constrained	  by	  ceilings	  on	  rent,	  ceased	  to	  rent	  their	  property.	  Today	  slums	  are	  expanding.	  Poor	  construction	   led,	  e.g.	   to	  a	  2002	  building	  collapse,	   killing	   52;	   conditions	   are	   unsanitary	   and	   health	   facilities	  absent	   in	  much	   informal	  housing.	  Some	   informal	  housing	  has	  been	  illegally	   cleared	  without	   authorities	   providing	   alternative	   housing.	  In	   parallel,	   investment	   of	   up	   to	   $20	   billion	   was	   channeled	   into	  luxury	   housing	   for	   the	   new	   rich	   and	   luxury	   tourist	   projects.	   State-­‐owned	   land	  was	   sold	   cheaply	   to	   investors	   and	   scarce	  public	   funds	  spent	  on	  extending	  infrastructure	  to	  these	  developments.	  This	  made	  land	   less	   available	   to	   low	   income	   people	   while	   the	   influx	   of	  investment	  drove	  up	  property	  prices	  300%	   in	   the	  2004-­‐06	  period.	  When	  rent	  controls	  were	  lifted	  on	  housing	  in	  Hama,	  costs	  soared	  7-­‐10	  times.	  The	  lack	  of	  affordable	  housing	  generated	  a	  crisis	  described	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as	   a	   “time	   bomb.”	   And	   indeed	   anti-­‐regime	  disturbances	   have	   been	  notable	  in	  such	  informal	  housing	  areas	  as	  Douma	  near	  Damascus.	  	  Goulden’s	  account	  of	  polarization	  is	  taken	  further	  by	  the	  papers	  in	  this	  issue.	  Balsam	  Ahmad	  examines	  informal	  housing	  in	  Aleppo,	  in	  many	   ways	   illustrative	   of	   the	   downside	   of	   urban,	   welfare	   and	  housing	   policy	   under	   “post-­‐populist”	   development.	   The	   decline	   in	  public	   funding	   for	   education	   and	   a	   halt	   to	   the	   building	   of	   state	  schools	   has	   left	   informal	   communities	   without	   such	   facilities	   and	  forces	  reliance	  on	  private	  tuition,	  hence,	  for	  the	  poor,	  lack	  of	  access	  to	   education.	   Educational	   attainment	   is	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	  health	   among	   women.	   When	   they	   acquire	   education,	   they	   can	  overcome	   the	   conservative	   patriarchal	   social	   norms	   that	   prevent	  them	   from	   seeking	   health	   care;	   education	   also	   goes	   with	  employment	   opportunities,	   which	   give	  women	  more	   power	   in	   the	  family	   especially	   in	   times	   of	   financial	   need:	   by	   contrast,	   illiterate	  girls,	  married	   off	   young	  by	   the	   parents	   to	   save	   expenses,	   have	   the	  opposite	  life	  chances,	  with	  partner	  violence	  and	  self-­‐harm	  identified	  in	  one,	  not	  untypical,	  case	   in	  Ahmad’s	  account.	  Unfortunately,	  80%	  of	  women	  were	  illiterate	  in	  informal	  Aleppo	  neighbourhoods.	  	  Yannick	   Sudermann	   exposes	   the	   reverse	   of	   the	   coin	   in	   his	  examination	   of	   the	   gentrification	   of	   the	   old	   city	   of	   Damascus.	   He	  shows	   that	   gentrification	   was	   a	   function	   of	   and	   paralleled	   class	  polarization.	  In	  the	  seventies,	  Damascus	  was	  a	  middle	  class	  city,	  but	  thereafter	   differentiation	   began	   as	   the	   middle	   class	   was	  impoverished	   and	   a	   new	   rich	   emerged.	   In	   turn,	   gentrification,	   in	  driving	  up	  property	  prices	  and	  reducing	  affordable	  housing	  even	  for	  the	  middle	  class,	  itself	  increases	  polarization.	  It	  was	  also,	  however,	  a	  manifestation	   of	   the	   authoritarian	   upgrading	   by	  which	   the	   regime	  used	   access	   to	   profitable	   opportunities	   in	   the	   old	   city	   to	   co-­‐opt	  investors	   who	   cut	   across	   networks	   composed	   of	   crony	   capitalists,	  the	   old	   bourgeoisie	   and	   external	   investors.	   This	   story	   well	  exemplifies	   both	   the	   risks	   and	   advantages	   of	   “authoritarian	  upgrading”	  for	  regime	  resilience.	  	  These	   two	   analyses	   expose	   the	   peculiar	   features	   of	   the	   Syrian	  uprising.	  While	  for	  example,	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  urban	  centre	  was	  the	  site	  of	   the	   uprising,	   in	   Syria,	   the	   urban	   centres	   have	   been	   quiescent,	   a	  function	  in	  part	  at	  least	  of	  the	  influx	  of	  investment	  and	  tourism	  from	  which	   the	   well-­‐off	   have	   benefited,	   enabling	   the	   regime	   to	   co-­‐opt	  them,	  as	  Sudermann	  shows;	  conversely,	  the	  periphery,	  deprived	  and	  neglected,	  as	  Ahmad	  shows,	  has	  been	  the	  site	  of	  rebellion	  among	  the	  deprived,	   once	   the	   regime’s	   constituency,	   now	   its	   enemy.
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Neighbourhood and Health 
Inequalities in Formal and Informal 
Neighbourhoods in Aleppo  
Balsam Ahmad 
Background This	   article1	   is	   based	  on	  qualitative	   research	   conducted	   in	  Aleppo,	  Syria	  in	  April-­‐May	  2011.	  It	  is	  part	  of	  a	  doctoral	  research	  project	  that	  explores	   the	   relationship	   between	   individual	   and	   neighbourhood	  socioeconomic	   status,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   and	  self-­‐reported	  health	  of	  women	  in	  formal	  and	  informal	  urban	  areas	  in	  Aleppo,	  on	  the	  other.	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  27	  women	  in	   formal	  and	   informal	  areas	   as	  well	   as	  with	   ten	   key	   informants	   (planners,	   NGO	   activists,	  private	   health	   providers	   and	   academics).	   The	   aim	   was	   to	   explore	  views	  of	   "compositional"	   (i.e.	   characteristics	  of	   individuals)	  as	  well	  as	   "contextual"	   features	   (i.e.	   characteristics	  of	  neighbourhoods	  and	  other	   upstream	   factors)	   that	   may	   result	   in	   gender	   and	   health	  inequalities.	   Key	   informants	   placed	   equal	   emphasis	   on	  compositional	  and	  contextual	  social	  determinants	  of	  health.	  They	  all	  pointed	  to	  educational	  attainment	  of	  women	  as	  the	  most	  important	  social	   determinant	   of	   their	   health.	   This	   study	   adds	   to	   the	   body	   of	  evidence	   on	   gender,	   urban	   and	   health	   inequalities	   in	   Syria.	  Understanding	   these	   interactions	  will	   be	   particularly	   important	   as	  Syria	  emerges	  from	  the	  present	  political	  crisis.	  
Introduction Health	   has	   been	   defined	   by	   the	   World	   Health	   Organisation	   as	   "a	  complete	   state	   of	   physical,	   mental	   and	   social	   well-­‐being,	   and	   not	  merely	  the	  absence	  of	  disease	  or	  infirmity"	  (WHO	  1946).	  In	  the	  last	  decade,	   the	   public	   health	   field	   saw	   a	   surge	   in	   research	   studies	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investigating	   the	   association	   between	   features	   of	   neighbourhoods	  and	  health.	  Research	  on	  neighbourhood	  and	  health	   is	  underpinned	  by	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  places	  of	   residence	   independently	   influence	  health.	   This	   influence	   is	   seen	   as	   being	   over	   and	   above	   the	  characteristics,	  circumstances,	  and	  behaviour	  of	  individuals.	  Studies	  on	   neighbourhood	   and	   health	   emphasise	   the	   need	   to	   distinguish	  both	   conceptually	   and	   empirically	   between	   "compositional"	   and	  "contextual"	   effects	   (Curtis	   and	   Jones	   1998;	  Macintyre	   et	   al.	   1993,	  2002):	   is	   it	   the	   characteristics	   of	   individuals	   (e.g.	   gender,	   race,	  education,	   social	   class)	   living	   in	   these	   areas	   ("compositional"	  factors)	   or	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   areas	   themselves	   such	   as	  neighbourhood	   socioeconomic	   status	   ("contextual"	   factors)	   which	  are	  more	  influential?	  	  These	   characteristics,	   compositional	   or	   contextual,	   are	   known	  as	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health.	   According	   to	   the	   WHO	  Commission	  on	  Social	  Determinants	  of	  Health,	  these	  are	  	  "the	  conditions	  in	  which	  people	  are	  born,	  grow,	  live,	  work	  and	  age,	  including	   the	   health	   system.	   These	   circumstances	   are	   shaped	   by	  the	  distribution	  of	  money,	  power	  and	  resources	  at	  global,	  national	  and	   local	   levels,	   which	   are	   themselves	   influenced	   by	   policy	  choices.	  The	  social	  determinants	  of	  health	  are	  mostly	  responsible	  for	   health	   inequities	   -­‐	   the	   unfair	   and	   avoidable	   differences	   in	  health	  status	  seen	  within	  and	  between	  countries"	  (WHO	  2011a).	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  "health	  inequalities"	  instead	  of	  "health	  inequities"	  which	  is	  used	  in	  the	  above	  WHO	  definition	  of	  the	  social	  determinants	  of	  health.	  Both	  terms	  are	  used	  to	  describe	  differences	  in	   health	   and	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   health	   determinants	   between	  individuals	   and	   communities.	   In	   using	   "health	   inequalities",	  differences	   in	   health	   are	   attributed	   to	   unfair	   conditions	   outside	  individuals’	   control	   as	   well	   as	   variations	   between	   individuals	   in	  biology	   (e.g.	   age;	   or	   race)	   or	   those	   resulting	   from	   individuals’	   free	  will.2	  According	   to	  Kawachi	  and	  colleagues	   inequity	  and	  equity	  are	  "political	  concepts,	  expressing	  a	  moral	  commitment	  to	  social	  justice"	  (Kawachi	  et	  al.	  2002:647)	  with	  "health	  inequity"	  referring	  to	  health	  inequalities	   that	   arise	   completely	   as	   a	   result	   of	   injustice	   or	  unfairness	   (Kawachi	   et	   al.	   2002).	   The	   Rio	   Political	   Declaration	   on	  Social	  Determinants	  of	  Health	  adopted	  in	  October	  2011	  stresses	  the	  need	   for	   immediate	   action	   on	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health	   to	  create	   "inclusive,	   equitable,	   economically	   productive	   and	   healthy	  societies"	  (WHO	  2011b).	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Studying	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health	   and	   health	  inequalities	  in	  Syria,	  especially	  in	  informal	  urban	  areas,	  is	  pertinent.	  More	   than	   half	   of	   the	   Syrian	   population	   lives	   in	   urban	   areas	   and	  over	   40%	   of	   urban	   residents	   reside	   in	   Damascus	   and	   Aleppo	  (Fernandes	   2008).	   The	   proportion	   of	   urban	   residents	   to	   the	   total	  population	   is	   expected	   to	   reach	   75%	   by	   2050	   (Fernandes	   2008;	  Lavinal	  2008).	  According	  to	  the	  report	  by	  El	  Laithy	  and	  Abu	  Ismail	  (2005),	   38.8%	  of	   the	   poor	   in	   Syria	   are	   in	   urban	   areas	   and	   a	   large	  proportion	  of	  them	  live	  in	  what	  is	  called	  in	  the	  literature,	  academic	  and	   official,	   "informal	   settlements"	   or	   sometimes	   "shanty	   towns",	  "squatter"	  or	  "illegal	  settlements"	  or	  "slums".	  The	  term	  used	   in	  the	  official	   documents	   in	   Syria	   is	   "al-­‐sakan	   al-­‐ ashwā’ī" (informal 
settlements).3	  Throughout	  this	  paper	  I	  also	  refer	  to	  these	  settlements	  as	   "informal	   areas"	   or	   "informal	   neighbourhoods".	   Current	  estimates	  show	  that	  40%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  cities	  of	  Damascus	  and	   Aleppo	   live	   in	   informal	   settlements	   (Lavinal	   2008).	   These	   are	  areas	   built	   haphazardly	   with	   no	   adherence	   to	   urban	   planning	   or	  building	   regulations.	   They	   are	   characterised	   by	   overcrowding,	  unsafe	  and	  poor	  quality	  housing	  and	  exposure	  to	  unknown	  levels	  of	  pollutants	   from	   unregulated	   industry,	   sewer	   outlets	   and	   waste	  dumps	   (Hammal	   et	   al.	   2005).	   Communities	   in	   these	   settlements	  suffer	   from	   marginalisation,	   social	   exclusion	   and	   lack	   of	  opportunities	   (Kabbani	   and	   Kamel	   2007).	   Women,	   in	   particular,	  have	  been	  reported	   to	  bear	  a	  disproportionate	  burden	  of	   ill	  health	  and	  disability	  (Maziak	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  The	   empirical	   literature	   on	   social	   determinants	   of	   health,	  including	   neighbourhood	   and	   health,	   is	   mostly	   quantitative	   and	  much	  of	   it	   is	   based	  on	  Western	   countries.	  This	   literature	  has	  been	  criticised	   for	   paying	   little	   attention	   to	   understanding	   the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  neighbourhoods	   influence	  health	  and	  health	  inequalities	   (Macintyre	   et	   al.	   2002;	   Riva	   et	   al.	   2007).	   Besides,	  because	   most	   of	   this	   literature	   originates	   in	   Western	   countries,	  neighbourhood	   informality	   as	   a	   neighbourhood	   characteristic	   that	  influences	  health	  has	  been	   largely	   ignored.	  Results	   from	  published	  Western	   studies	   (Riva	  et	   al.	   2007)	   show	   that	   characteristics	  of	   the	  place	   of	   residence	   such	   as	   socioeconomic	   ones	   affect	   women	   and	  men	   in	   different	   ways.	   An	   unpublished	   paper	   based	   on	   my	   PhD	  research	   (Ahmad	   et	   al.	   2012)	   shows	   that	  women’s	   health	   (but	   not	  that	   of	   men)	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   both	   socioeconomic	  characteristics	  and	  formality	  of	  neighbourhoods.	  	  The	  aim	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   social	  determinants	  of	  health	   that	  may	   explain	   urban	   health	   inequalities,	   especially	   those	  
10    Syria’s Contrasting Neighbourhoods  
between	  and	  within	  formal	  and	  informal	  neighbourhoods	  in	  Aleppo.	  Based	   on	   a	   qualitative	   study	   exploring	   the	   perspectives	   of	   key	  informants,	   the	   paper	   is	   part	   of	   a	   mixed-­‐method	   PhD	   study	   on	  neighbourhood	   and	   individual	   socioeconomic	   status	   and	   self-­‐reported	  health	   of	  women	   in	   formal	   and	   informal	  neighbourhoods	  in	   Aleppo.	   My	   PhD	   research	   builds	   upon	   previous	   studies	   of	  informal	   settlements	   in	  Aleppo,	  Syria	   (Hammal	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Maziak	  et	   al.	   2005).	   However,	   it	   differs	   from	   them	   in	   that	   it	   explores	   in	  depth	   the	   relative	   influence	   of	   compositional	   and	   contextual	  characteristics	  as	  well	  as	  neighbourhood	  formality	  on	  self-­‐reported	  health	  of	  married	  women.	  	  Section	   2	   of	   this	   paper	   consists	   of	   a	   brief	   review	   of	   factors	  influencing	   the	   growth	   of	   informal	   settlements	   in	   Syria	   and	   the	  environmental	   and	   health	   challenges	   resulting	   from	   this	   growth.	  Section	   3	   is	   a	   brief	   description	   of	   the	   methods	   used	   in	   data	  collection	   and	   analysis,	   together	   with	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	  respondents.	   Section	   4	   includes	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	  empirical	   findings.	   In	   the	   final	   section,	   Section	   5,	   I	   discuss	   these	  findings	   by	   placing	   them	   within	   wider	   debates	   in	   the	   published	  empirical	   literature	   on	   social	   determinants	   of	   health,	   trying	   to	  uncover	   the	   relative	   role	   that	   individual	   and	   neighbourhood	  characteristics	   have	   in	   explaining	   health	   inequalities	   between	   and	  within	  formal	  and	  informal	  neighbourhoods	  in	  Aleppo.	  	  
The Challenge of Informal Settlements in Syria In	  Aleppo,	  Syria’s	  second	  city,	  29	  informal	  settlements	  (out	  of	  a	  total	  of	   114	   neighbourhoods	   classified	   by	   the	   municipality)	   occupied	  about	   45%	   of	   the	   city’s	   inhabited	   area	   and	   were	   home	   to	   an	  estimated	   one	   million	   people	   in	   2004,	   i.e.	   about	   40%	   of	   Aleppo’s	  estimated	   total	   population	   of	   2.5	   million	   (Hammal	   et	   al.	   2005;	  Maziak	  et	  al.	  2005).	  Most	  residents	  of	   the	   informal	  areas	   in	  Aleppo	  come	   from	   rural	   areas	   of	   Aleppo	   governorate	   or	   other	   Syrian	  governorates.	   Some	   also	   migrated	   within	   the	   city,	   especially	   from	  the	  old	  quarter,	  benefiting	  from	  the	  gentrification	  of	  the	  old	  city	  and	  rocketing	   property	   prices.	   Many	   sold	   their	   homes	   and	   bought	  multiple	   properties	   in	   informal	   settlements	   or	   other	   poor	   formal	  neighbourhoods	  (Fernandes	  2008).	  	  The	   current	   annual	   growth	   rate	   of	   informal	   settlements	   in	  Aleppo	  has	  been	  estimated	  at	  4%.	  That	  is	  about	  6,000	  households	  a	  year,	   which	   necessitates	   the	   establishment	   of	   125	   new	   homes	   in	  informal	   settlements	   each	   week.4	   Wakely	   (2008)	   gives	   a	   slightly	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higher	  estimate:	  160	  new	  dwellings	  per	  week	   to	  accommodate	   the	  expected	   population	   increase.	   Population	   density	   in	   these	  settlements	  ranges	  from	  an	  estimated	  200	  person	  per	  hectare	  (pph)	  (20,000	  per	   square	  km)	   to	   as	  high	   as	  750	  pph	   (75,000	  per	   square	  km)	  in	  areas	  where	  multi-­‐story	  apartment	  buildings	  have	  been	  built	  (Hammal	  et	   al.	   2005).	   Informal	   settlements	   in	  Aleppo	  have	   sprung	  up	  in	  the	  eastern,	  northern,	  and	  southern	  parts	  of	  the	  city,	  while	  the	  western	   part	   is	   designated	   for	   planned	   expansion.	   Their	   levels	   of	  urbanization	   in	   the	   form	   of	   housing	   style	   (single-­‐story	   or	   multi-­‐story	   buildings)	   and	   population	   density	   differ	   according	   to	   their	  geographical	   location.	   The	   settlements	   in	   the	   northern	   part	   are	  considered	   to	   be	   more	   urbanised	   and	   those	   in	   the	   eastern	   more	  rural	   (Hammal	   et	   al.	   2005).	   Additionally,	   the	   predominant	  industries	  differ	  according	   to	   the	  geographical	   location	  of	   informal	  settlements.	  The	  northern	  part	  has	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  tanneries	  and	   car	   repair	   workshops	   as	   well	   as	   the	   city’s	   main	   waste	   dump	  sites.	   The	   eastern	   part	   has	  many	   unregulated	  workshops	   between	  houses,	  while	  the	  southern	  has	  numerous	  industries,	  such	  as	  cement	  plants,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   main	   sewer	   outlet	   of	   the	   whole	   city	  (Hammal	  et	  al.	  2005).	  In	  general,	  informal	  settlements	  in	  Aleppo	  and	  overall	  in	  Syria	  are	  not	  true	  slums	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  in	  most	  African	  or	  Asian	   slums	   (see	   picture	   1.1).	   Regulations	   in	   the	   1980s	   stipulated	  that	  informal	  areas	  must	  be	  provided	  with	  basic	  services	  and	  public	  utilities.	   Many	   informal	   areas	   of	   Aleppo	   are	   provided	   with	   public	  utilities	   such	   as	   electricity,	   water,	   sewerage,	   telecommunications	  and	   limited	   collection	   of	   refuse,	   and	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	  residents	   of	   these	   areas	   pay	   a	   service	   tax	   to	   the	   municipality	  (Lavinal	  2008).	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Picture 1.1: Main Road of an Informal Settlement, Northern Aleppo 
	  
Source: Photograph by Balsam Ahmad, 2007. 
There	   are	   several	   factors	   to	   which	   the	   proliferation	   of	   informal	  areas	   in	  Syria	  has	  been	  attributed.	  These	   could	  be	   classified	  under	  demographic,	   legal	  and	  policy	   factors.	  Demographic	   factors	   include	  mass	   rural-­‐urban	   migration	   to	   major	   urban	   centres,	   especially	  Damascus	   and	   Aleppo;	   a	   high	   rate	   of	   overall	   population	   growth	  (officially	  estimated	  at	  2.37%	  between	  2006	  and	  2010);	  and	  a	  large	  influx	  of	  refugees	  from	  neighbouring	  countries	  (Lavinal	  2008).	  The	  refugee	  problem	  started	  with	  Palestinians,	  who	  fled	  to	  Syria	  in	  1948	  and	  1967;	  then	  came	  the	  Lebanese	  between	  1975	  and	  2006;	  and	  in	  2003	   and	   thereafter	   1.5-­‐2	   million	   Iraqis	   were	   estimated	   to	   have	  taken	  refuge	  in	  Syria	  (Lavinal	  2008).	  Among	  policy	  and	  legal	  factors	  is	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   national	   legal	   planning	   system	   and	   housing	  policies	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  growing	  housing	  needs	  of	  the	  urban	  poor.	   Under-­‐investment	   in	   rural	   areas	   and	   environmental	  challenges,	   such	   as	   water	   shortages	   and	   increased	   salinisation	   of	  agricultural	   land,	   are	   factors	   that	   might	   have	   sustained	   the	   rural-­‐urban	  migration.	   Conflicting	   laws	   and	   policies	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	  problem	   of	   informal	   settlements	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   coherent	   strategies	  and	   actions	   in	   preventing	   their	   growth	   have	   also	   been	   cited	   as	  factors	   that	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   proliferation	   of	   informal	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settlements	   in	   Syria	   (Fernardes	   2008;	   Lavinal	   2008).	   The	   last	   few	  months	  of	  political	   turmoil	   in	  Syria	  have	  witnessed	  an	  acceleration	  in	   illegal	   building	   activities,	   especially	   in	   informal	   settlements	  (author’s	  observation;	  personal	  conversation).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  documentation,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  give	  precise	  figures	  of	  this	  recent	  growth	   in	   informal	   settlements.	   However,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   informal	  housing	  would	  become	  the	  norm	  if	  this	  observed	  growth	  continued	  unabated.	  	  
Method My	  PhD	   study	   uses	   an	   explanatory	   sequential	   design	  whereby	   the	  qualitative	   part	   builds	   on	   the	   quantitative	   part	   to	   explain	   some	   of	  the	   quantitative	   results	   (Creswell	   &	   Plano	   Clark	   2011).	   The	  qualitative	  fieldwork	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  Aleppo	  in	  April-­‐May	  2011,	  a	  month	   after	   civil	   unrest	   in	   Syria	   had	   started.	   It	   involved	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   27	   married	   women	   and	   10	   key	  informants,	  including	  service	  providers	  in	  informal	  areas	  and	  urban	  planners.	   This	   paper	   reports	   findings	   from	   the	   key	   informant	  interviews.5	  	  The	   key	   informants	   were	   purposively	   chosen	   for	   their	  professional	  role.	  They	  include	  actors	  who	  have	  detailed	  knowledge	  about	   the	   individual	   and	   structural	   factors	   that	   bring	   about	   health	  inequalities	   between	   formal	   and	   informal	   areas,	   especially	   those	  that	   disadvantage	   low	   income	   women	   in	   informal	   areas.	   The	   aim	  was	  to	  achieve	  in	  the	  sample	  of	  participants	  a	  mix	  of	  those	  working	  with	   the	   informal	   communities	   at	   the	   grass	   roots	   level,	   such	   as	  service	   providers,	   and	   those	   whose	   job	   implies	   a	   more	   strategic	  overview	  of	   the	  various	  neighbourhoods	  and	  communities,	   such	  as	  urban	   planners.	   Because	   of	   the	   volatility	   of	   the	   political	   situation,	  and	  wariness	   towards	  researchers	   linked	  to	  western	   institutions,	  a	  judgment	  was	  made	  to	  maintain	  a	   lower	  profile	   than	  usually	   is	   the	  case.	   This	   meant	   that	   all	   key	   informants	   were	   approached	  informally	  through	  personal	  contacts	  of	  either	  the	  lead	  researcher’s	  social	  network	  or	  the	  supervisory	  team.	  In	  total,	  14	  key	  informants	  were	   approached	   for	   an	   interview,	   two	   declined	   and	   two	   were	  conducted	   but	   were	   interrupted	   and	   very	   brief.	   Therefore,	   I	   only	  draw	  on	  the	  findings	  from	  interviews	  with	  ten	  key	  informants.	  Table	  1.1	  shows	  the	  characteristics	  of	  these	  key	  informants.	  Of	  the	  ten	  key	  informants	   interviewed,	   five	   worked	   with	   low	   income/informal	  communities	   at	   the	   grass-­‐roots	   level	   as	   service	  providers	   in	   either	  education	  or	  health.	  Questions	  focused	  on	  the	  conceptions	  of	  the	  key	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problems	   facing	   poor	   women	   in	   general	   and	   how	   these	   problems	  vary	   according	   to	   area	   of	   residence,	   especially	   for	   the	   married	  women	   living	   in	   informal	   neighbourhoods.	   Interviews	   varied	   in	  length	   from	   approximately	   30	   minutes	   to	   one	   hour,	   partly	  dependent	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   the	   participants.	   Interviews	   were	  conducted	   in	   colloquial	   Arabic.	   Detailed	   notes	   were	   taken	   in	   all	  interviews	  apart	   from	  one	  which	  was	  recorded.	  During	   the	   time	  of	  the	   fieldwork,	   I	   kept	   a	   reflective	   diary	   in	   which	   I	   recorded	   daily	  notes	  on	  encounters,	  informal	  discussions	  and	  observations	  related	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  research.	  	  
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the Key Informant Participant Sample 
KI-1 – Female; midwife, private/public employment 
KI-2 – Female; counsellor and midwife, NGO  
KI-3 - Female doctor (gynaecologist), private clinic in an informal 
area  
KI-4 - Male, Kurdish doctor, private clinic in the most deprived 
location of an informal area 
KI-5 - Female, teacher at a middle school in a Palestinian informal 
area 
KI-6 - Male, primary health care, public sector 
KI-7 - Male, priest, charity in a low income formal area  
KI-8 - Male, urban planner, NGO and international donor 
KI-9 - Female, urban planner, private and public sectors and NGO 
KI-10 - Male, public sector (municipality and academia) 
Interviews	  were	  analysed	  thematically,	  applying	  a	  coding	  frame	  that	  built	  on	  an	  a	  priori	  framework.	  The	  same	  coding	  frame	  was	  used	  to	  analyse	   the	   field	   notes	   in	   the	   reflective	   diary.	   Themes	   were	  generated	   both	   from	   the	   research	   questions	   and	   literature,	   and	  through	   iterative	   reading	   of	   the	   data	   (Lewis	   et	   al.	   2003).	   The	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findings	   from	   the	   interviews	   with	   key	   informants	   will	   be	  triangulated	  with	   the	   findings	   from	  the	   interviews	  with	  27	  women	  living	   in	   formal	   and	   informal	   areas,	   sampled	   from	   across	   the	  socioeconomic	   spectrum,	   and	   ultimately	  with	   a	  multilevel	   analysis	  of	  quantitative	  data	  undertaken	  in	  2010.	  
Findings Here	   I	   present	   the	  main	   themes	   that	   resulted	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	  the	  interviews	  with	  key	  informants.	  These	  themes	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  mechanisms	   behind	   gender	   and	   geographical	   health	   inequalities.	   I	  classified	   these	   into	   two	   main	   categories,	   namely,	   neighbourhood	  and	  individual	  characteristics.	  
Neighbourhood Characteristics The	   narratives	   of	   key	   informants	   were	   rich	   in	   details	   about	  neighbourhood	   characteristics	   that	   influence	   health.	   The	   most	  prominent	   among	   those	   mentioned	   were	   neighbourhood	  socioeconomic	   characteristics,	   neighbourhood	   environmental	  profiles	  and	  neighbourhood	  resources.	  I	  describe	  each	  below.	  
Differences in Neighbourhood Socioeconomic Characteristics 
between and within Neighbourhoods A	   number	   of	   key	   informants	   noted	   that	   neighbourhoods	  were	   not	  homogenous	   in	   their	   socioeconomic	   characteristics	  but	   there	  were	  differences	  between	  and	  within	  neighbourhoods.	  Knowledge	  of	   the	  perceived	   causes	   and	   nature	   of	   such	   differences	   can	   be	   helpful	   in	  understanding	   geographical	   health	   inequalities.	   Aspects	   of	   these	  differences	  and	  how	  they	  influence	  health	  are	  discussed	  below.	  	  
Differences	  of	  socioeconomic	  characteristics	  between	  neighbourhoods	  	  A	   number	   of	   key	   informants	   noted	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   social	  characteristics	   of	   neighbourhoods,	   especially	   the	   informal	   areas,	  based	  on	  the	  place	  of	  origin	  of	  their	  residents.	  Two	  urban	  planners	  (KI-­‐8	  and	  KI-­‐9)	  classified	  informal	  settlements	  into	  categories	  based	  on	  the	  origin	  of	   the	  people	  who	   lived	  there.	  The	   first	   type	   includes	  those	   areas	   that	   attracted	   desperate	   social	   groups	   "united	   in	  
poverty"(KI-­‐9)	   and	   who	   came	   from	   rural	   or	   urban	   areas	   with	  different	   social	   norms.6	   According	   to	   these	   key	   informants, such 
areas within the informal zone can be found in the southern part of the 
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city, for example al-Ansāri and Tal al-Zarāzīr. The latter is usually home 
to poor people who work as cleaners or in menial government jobs (KI-
9). The second type of informal areas is that which received large groups 
from the same ethnicity originating in one or two areas with similar 
social norms. An example is Shaykh Maqsūd, an area in northern 
Aleppo with a majority of Kurds. This division into two categories was 
contested by	  another	  key	  informant,	  also	  an	  urban	  planner,	  who	  said:	  	  "No,	  I	  do	  not	  entirely	  agree	  with	  this	  classification.	  The	  reason	  for	  migration	  to	  a	  certain	  area	  does	  not	  come	  from	  nowhere.	  Usually	  you	   find	   that	   people	   come	   together	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   clan,	   tribe	   or	  their	  belonging	  to	  a	  certain	  rural	  area.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  eastern	  areas,	  you	  find	  a	  majority	  of	  people	  from	  Idlib	  and	  its	  countryside.	  Generally,	  no	  one	  chooses	  a	  certain	  area	  randomly.	  There	  is	  always	  a	  reason,	  mostly	  family,	  relatives	  or	  friends"	  (KI-­‐10).	  	  The	   narratives	   of	   the	   key	   informants	   included	  many	   references	   to	  the	   effect	   of	   different	   areas’	   social	   norms	   on	   social	   and	   health	  problems,	   especially	   those	   facing	   women.	   For	   example,	  consanguineous	  marriages	   are	   very	   prevalent	   in	   certain	   areas	   and	  as	  a	  result	  genetic	  deformities	  are	  more	  common.	  	  "In	   some	   neighbourhood	   consanguineous	   marriages	   are	   more	  prominent	   than	   others	   and	   some	   have	   become	   isolated	   areas	  where	   only	   one	   extended	   family	   is	   present.	   In	   some	   informal	  areas,	   one	   can	   see	   first	   degree	   consanguineous	   marriages	  representing	  36-­‐40%	  of	  marriages	  and	  up	   to	  70%	  second	  degree	  consanguineous	   marriages.	   This	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   many	   genetic	  defects	  especially	  male	  linked"	  (KI-­‐9).	  Many	  key	  informants	  pointed	  out	  to	  differences	  in	  neighbourhoods’	  social	  norms	  that	   impacted	   individual	  determinants	  of	  health,	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  children	  a	  woman	  bore:	  	  "I	   noticed	   that	   in	   Afrīn [Kurdish]	   villages7 women have more 
awareness of family planning.... whereas villages that are linked to al-
Bāb, al-Safīreh or Manbej and their suburbs have a tribal system, and 
in such societies there is a culture of having a large	   number	   of	  children.	  The	  more	  children,	  the	  more	  power	  a	  man	  has"	  (KI-­‐2).	  	  A	  key	  informant	  doctor	  working	  in	  an	  informal	  area	  with	  a	  majority	  Kurdish	   population,	   many	   of	   whom	   came	   originally	   from	   Afrīn	  villages,	   confirmed	  what	  KI-­‐2	   said:	   "Compared	   to	   other	   low	   income	  
poor	  areas	  women	  in	  this	  area	  do	  not	  have	  many	  kids"	  (KI-­‐3).	  Social	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norms	  not	   only	   influence	   the	   number	   of	   children	  women	  bear	   but	  also	  their	  health	  seeking	  behaviour,	  especially	  in	  some	  communities.	  One	   key	   informant	   from	   the	   health	   service	   pointed	   out	   how	  religious	   conservatism	   influences	   health	   seeking	   behaviour	   of	  women	  and	  how,	  combined	  with	  poverty,	   this	   can	   influence	  health	  outcomes:	  	  "There	   are	   poor	   neighbourhoods	   in	   which	   women	   would	   not	  utilise	   the	   medical	   services	   and	   prefer	   to	   use	   an	   unqualified	  midwife	  if	  a	  female	  doctor	  is	  not	  available.	  In	  many	  areas	  residents	  are	   conservative	   and	   even	   if	   a	   male	   doctor	   has	   the	   highest	  specialisation	  women	  will	  not	  use	  his	  services"	  (KI-­‐6).	  	  
Differences	  of	  socioeconomic	  characteristics	  within	  neighbourhoods	  	  Key	   informants	   who	   worked	   at	   the	   grass-­‐roots	   community	   level	  noted	  differences	  in	  the	  social	  composition	  and	  social	  norms	  among	  residents	   of	   small	   geographical	   localities	   within	   the	   same	  neighbourhood.	  All	   examples	   given	  were	   from	   informal	   areas.	  One	  key	   informant,	   who	   works	   in	   an	   informal	   area	   inhabited	   by	  Palestinian	   refugees,	   noted	   that	   residents	   of	   a	   relatively	   new	  development	  housing	  project	  in	  this	  area	  differ	  in	  their	  social	  norms	  from	  the	  "indigenous"	  residents	  of	  the	  area:	  	  "You	   can	   see	   that	   the	   houses	   from	   the	   outside	   are	   very	   nice;	   all	  have	   a	   Chalet	   style	   but	   from	   the	   inside	   there	   are	   social	   illnesses	  and	  problems.	  Even	  the	  children	  I	  teach	  come	  and	  tell	  me	  ‘teacher,	  this	   child	   is	   from	   the	   "project"	   ...he	   does	   not	   care	   about	   study'"	  	  (KI-­‐5).	  	  This	   key	   informant	   then	   went	   on	   to	   compare	   the	   social	   norms	   of	  residents	   of	   the	   project	  with	   those	   of	   the	   original	   residents	   of	   the	  area,	   who	   are	   religiously	   more	   conservative	   Muslims.	   The	   key	  informant	  emphasised	  that	  despite	  being	  conservative	  Muslims,	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  original	  residents	  places	  more	  value	  on	  the	  education	  of	  women:	  	  "The	   original	   people	   of	   (name	   of	   area)	   refugee	   camp	   are	   more	  conservative.	   They	  have	  been	   in	   it	   for	   a	   long	   time.	   ....the	   families	  are	  all	  related	  to	  each	  other	  one	  way	  or	  another	  as	  they	  originally	  came	   to	   the	   refugee	   area	   from	   one	   area.	   They	   are	   conservative	  Muslims	  and	  mostly	  educated,	  even	  the	  women"	  (KI-­‐5).	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In	   another	   example,	   two	   health	   service	   providers	   working	   in	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  same	   informal	  area	  alluded	   to	  socioeconomic	  inequalities	  within	  the	  area.	  A	  doctor	  working	  in	  a	  majority	  Kurdish	  informal	   area	   (KI-­‐4)	   and	   in	   its	   most	   deprived	   street	   noted	   that	  almost	   all	   the	   residents	   in	   the	   locality	   were	   very	   poor.	   In	   this	  account,	  the	  key	  informant	  made	  clear	  that	  this	  particular	  locality’s	  socioeconomic	   position	  was	   lower	   than	   other	   localities	  within	   the	  same	  neighbourhood:	  	  "There	   are	   differences	   between	   this	   area	   and	   other	   areas	   in	  (name)	   in	   all	   aspects.	   (The	   locality)	   is	   characterised	   by	   extreme	  poverty,	   low	  education	  and	  very	  few	  services....	   in	  people’s	  minds	  this	  is	  a	  different	  area	  from	  (name	  of	  informal	  area)"	  (KI-­‐4).	  	  
Differences in Environmental Health Profiles Between Informal 
Neighbourhoods Several	  key	  informants	  noted	  that	  residents	  of	  informal	  settlements	  suffered	   from	   a	   double	   burden	   of	   disease	  with	   high	   prevalence	   of	  both	   communicable	   and	   non-­‐communicable	   diseases.	   However,	  according	   to	   these	   key	   informants,	   the	   pattern	   of	   certain	   diseases	  differs	   between	   neighbourhoods.	   In	   many	   cases,	   it	   is	   the	   most	  common	   type	   of	   industrial	   workshops	   within	   the	   area	   that	  determines	  the	  type	  of	  environmental	  disease	  prevalent	  in	  a	  certain	  neighbourhood.	   In	   most	   informal	   neighbourhoods,	   industrial	  workshops	  exist	  between	  houses	  and	  are	  unregulated.	  For	  example,	  some	   informal	   neighbourhoods	   such	   as	   al-­‐Ḥaydarīyah or Shaykh 
Fāres have a high concentration of unregulated shoe-making workshops.  It	   was	   mostly	   the	   interviewed	   urban	   planners	   who	   noted	   the	  differing	   environmental	   disease	   patterns	   between	   informal	   areas	  and	  the	  many	  factors	  that	  interplay	  to	  cause	  this.	  One	  urban	  planner	  noted	  the	  high	  prevalence	  of	  lead	  poisoning	  in	  some	  informal	  areas	  which	  have	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  battery	  workshops.	  According	  to	  this	  key	  informant	  (KI10),	  lead	  poisoning	  was	  particularly	  prevalent	  among	   children	   aged	   10-­‐12	   due	   to	   uncontrolled	   child	   labour	   in	  those	  workshops	  and	  the	  particular	  vulnerability	  of	  children	  to	  lead.	  Another	   urban	   planner	   interviewed	   (KI9)	   noted	   different	  community	   health	   profiles	   between	   informal	   areas	   naming	   some	  neighbourhoods	   where	   certain	   environmental	   diseases	   are	   highly	  prevalent:	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"Asthma and respiratory infections among women and children are 
very common in Shaykh Sa‘īd, which has a cement factor. Shaykh 
Najjārr is another	  area	  which	   is	  severely	   infected.	  There	   is	  mental	  retardation	   and	   high	   prevalence	   of	   congenital	   deformities	   in	   the	  area.	   This	   is	   an	   industrial	   area	   with	   men	   usually	   working	   in	  unregulated	   industries	   as	   well	   as	   high	   levels	   of	   consanguineous	  marriages	   and	   high	   levels	   of	   illiteracy……	   Tuberculosis	   is	   now	  highly	   prevalent	   in	   al-­‐Ḥaydarīyah.	   There	   are	   many	   industrial	  workshops	  underground	  in	  this	  area	  and	  it	  is	  usually	  the	  working	  men	  that	  get	   infected	  first	  and	   infect	   their	   family.	  Housing	   is	  also	  very	   crowded	   making	   it	   easy	   for	   tuberculosis	   or	   any	   infectious	  disease	  to	  spread	  fast".	  (KI-­‐9)	  
Differences of Neighbourhood Resources between and within 
Neighbourhoods  Key	   informants	   noted	   differences	   in	   the	   presence	   and	   quality	   of	  health	  services	  and	  educational	   facilities	  between	  neighbourhoods,	  especially	   between	   formal	   and	   informal	   areas.	   Two	   health	   service	  providers	   made	   reference	   to	   the	   inequalities	   between	   formal	   and	  informal	  neighbourhoods	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  public	  health	  services	  (non-­‐fee-­‐paying).	   Even	   when	   the	   services	   were	   available	   in	   poor	  neighbourhoods,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  service	  was	  reportedly	  worse	  in	  poor	   areas.	   One	   key	   informant	   (KI-­‐6)	   noted	   that	   even	   fee-­‐paying	  private	  health	  services	  are	  of	  a	  questionable	  quality	  in	  poor	  areas,	  as	  they	  mostly	  rely	  on	  unspecialised	  doctors	  and	  midwifes.	  Despite	  the	  poor	  quality	  of	  health	  services	   in	  poor	  neighbourhoods	   they	  are	   in	  particularly	   high	   demand.	   According	   to	   this	   key	   informant:	   "A	  
government	  health	  centre	  in	  a	  deprived	  area	  will	  usually	  receive	  many	  
times	  the	  number	  of	  patients	  as	  a	  similar	  one	  in	  a	  wealthy	  area,	  hence	  
stretching	  its	  resources	  further"(KI-­‐6).	  	  Inequality	   in	   the	   availability	   of	   services	  was	   also	   noted	  within	  neighbourhoods.	   For	   example,	   one	  deprived	   locality	  within	   a	   large	  informal	   neighbourhood	   had	   reportedly	   very	   few	   private	   medical	  services	   compared	   to	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   informal	   area.	   The	   hardly	  passable	  alleyways,	  especially	  in	  winter,	  and	  unavailability	  of	  public	  transport	   in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  neighbourhood,	  mean	  that	  residents	  have	   limited	   access	   to	   basic	   health	   services	   (KI-­‐4).	   Some	   key	  informants	   identified	   lack	  of	   educational	   facilities,	   such	   as	   schools,	  in	   informal	   neighbourhoods,	   as	   a	   constraint	   to	   educational	  attainment.	   Some	   reported	   the	   poor	   quality	   of	   teaching	   even	   if	  schools	   were	   present.	   References	   were	   made	   to	   the	   decline	   of	  government	   funding	   in	   state	   education	   and	   the	   increased	   reliance	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on	  private	  tuition	  to	  compensate	  for	  poor	  tutoring	  in	  state	  schools.	  One	  key	  informant	  noted:	  	  "The	   schools	   are	   bad	   quality	   in	   formal	   areas	   so	   how	   about	  informal	  areas	  or	  low	  income	  areas	  that	  suffer	  from	  crowdedness.	  This	  is	  more	  severe	  now	  as	  there	  have	  been	  no	  new	  state	  schools	  been	  built	  for	  a	  long	  time	  in	  many	  areas…."	  (KI-­‐1).	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  is	  profound,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  upward	  social	  mobility	   and	   increased	   life	   chances	   for	   the	   disadvantaged	   in	   poor	  areas.	  Key	  informants	  indirectly	  pointed	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  neoliberal	  policies	   that	   rely	   on	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   expand	   the	   education	  sector	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   state	   funding	   for	   free	   education	   in	  public	   schools.	   This	   means	   an	   increased	   difficulty	   for	   the	   more	  socioeconomically	   disadvantaged	   groups	   to	   improve	   their	   life	  chances	   and	   get	   out	   of	   poverty	   through	   education.	   As	   one	   key	  informant	  put	  it:	  	  "Usually	  education	  is	  a	  method	  for	  climbing	  the	  social	   ladder	  and	  for	  social	  upgrading.	  However,	  in	  this	  area,	  there	  is	  very	  low	  level	  of	   education	   and	   the	  proportion	  of	   those	  who	  go	   to	  university	   is	  very	  low"	  (KI-­‐4).	  
Individual Characteristics According	   to	   key	   informants	   two	   individual	   characteristics	  namely	  educational	   attainment	   and	   family	   income	   have	   profound	   impacts	  on	   gender	   related	   social	   and	   health	   inequalities.	   In	   this	   account,	   I	  focus	  on	  these	  two	  individual	  characteristics	  as	  they	  featured	  most	  in	  the	  narratives	  of	  key	  informants	  as	  factors	  explaining	  gender	  and	  health	  inequalities.	  	  
Income  
The	  Relationship	  between	  Income	  and	  Educational	  Attainment	  	  In	   their	   accounts,	   many	   key	   informants	   explained	   the	   strong	  interconnectedness	   of	   family	   income,	   early	   age	   of	   marriage,	  illiteracy	  or	  low	  educational	  attainment	  and	  women’s	  health.	  As	  one	  female	  key	  informant	  health	  service	  provider	  put	  it:	  	  "In	   low	  income	  Aleppo	  society,	  parents	  marry	  off	   their	  daughters	  young	  so	  that	  they	  get	  rid	  of	  her	  living	  expenses.	  This	  means	  that	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many	   girls	   leave	   school	   early	   and	   do	   not	   continue	   with	   their	  education"	  (KI-­‐2).	  Some	  key	  informants	  pointed	  out	  the	  effect	  of	  lower	  socioeconomic	  status	  during	  the	  life	  course,	  which	  results	   in	   limited	  opportunities	  for	  educational	  attainment	  for	  children	  of	  disadvantaged	  families.	  As	  was	   already	   mentioned	   above,	   for	   many	   key	   informants	   the	  prevailing	  culture	  of	  private	  tuition	  and	  the	  deteriorating	  quality	  of	  state	   schools	   are	   perceived	   as	   barriers	   to	   educational	   attainment,	  especially	  for	  the	  socioeconomically	  disadvantaged.	  A	  key	  informant	  in	   a	   very	   low	   income	   Christian	   area	   bordering	   a	   large	   informal	  settlement	  commented	  on	  the	  limited	  opportunities	  for	  educational	  attainment	  that	  children	  of	  poor	  families	  have:	  	  "Education	   now	   is	   very	  much	   interlinked	   to	   financial	   strength.	   If	  you	   are	   poor,	   there	   are	   very	   few	   opportunities	   to	   get	   tutors	   to	  teach	  private	  lessons	  voluntarily	  and	  private	  tuition	  is	  usually	  very	  expensive…The	   families	  here	  would	   like	   their	   children	   to	   receive	  better	   education	   but	   to	   provide	   them	  with	   this	   opportunity	   they	  usually	  need	  financial	  resources.	  Therefore	  we	  had	  cases	  when	  the	  parents	   took	   their	   kids	   out	   of	   school	   as	   they	   could	   not	   afford	   it"	  (KI-­‐7).	  
The	  Relationship	  between	  Income	  and	  Health	  Service	  Utilisation	  For	  key	  informants	  working	  in	  the	  health	  service,	  poverty	  was	  seen	  as	  limiting	  factor	  to	  health	  service	  utilisation:	  	  "Some	   poor	   women	   get	   very	   ill	   until	   they	   consult	   the	   doctor	   in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  medical	  fees	  and	  be	  able	  to	  put	  food	  on	  the	  table.	  Since	   we	   started	   introducing	   minimal	   consultation	   fees	   in	   the	  association	   seven	   years	   ago,	   the	   number	   of	   low	   income	   women	  coming	  here	  declined.	  In	  their	  minds,	  women	  calculate	  the	  cost	  of	  getting	   to	   the	   association	   plus	   the	   fees	   and	   it	   becomes	   too	  expensive	  for	  them	  to	  come"	  (KI-­‐2).	  However,	   another	   health	   service	   provider	   did	   not	   agree	   with	  poverty	   being	   a	   barrier	   to	   health	   service	   utilisation,	   especially	  among	  certain	  age	  groups.	  A	  private	  gynaecologist	   in	  a	   low	  income	  informal	  area	  mentioned	  that	  women	  in	  the	  area	  usually	  consult	  for	  the	  slightest	  of	  problems	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  pregnant.	  When	  I	  asked	  her	  what	  she	  thought	  the	  reason	  behind	  this	  was,	  she	  stated:	  "It	   is	   It	   is	   not	   because	   of	   better	   awareness	   or	   education	   or	   because	  
they	   have	   time,	   but	   fear	   from	   the	   unknown"	   (KI-­‐3).	   She	   explained	  further	   that	   low	   income	   women	   were	   aware	   that	   if	   anything	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happened	   to	   their	   fertility	   their	   position	   and	   status	   with	   the	  husband,	  his	  family	  and	  the	  society	  would	  be	  in	  danger.	  This	  in	  turn	  she	   saw	   as	   explanation	   for	   their	   fear	   and	   high	   consultation	   of	  medical	   services	   whilst	   pregnant.	   Other	   service	   providers	   also	  referred	  to	  cases	  of	  young	  uneducated	  low	  income	  married	  women	  who	  could	  not	  go	   to	   the	  doctor	  when	   ill	  because	   they	  cannot	   leave	  the	  house	  alone	  and	  the	  husband	  or	  his	  family	  refused	  to	  accompany	  them.	  	  
Educational Attainment  Key	   informants	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   educational	   attainment	  as	   the	  number	   one	   individual	   determinant	   impacting	   the	  health	   of	  women.	   Key	   informants	   linked	   better	   educational	   attainment	   of	  women	   to	   increased	   social	   status,	   improved	   decision	   making	   and	  better	  health	  for	  the	  women	  and	  their	  families.	  
Educational	   Attainment	   as	   a	   Source	   of	   Power	   and	   Social	   Status	  	  
for	  Women	  Only	   female	   key	   informants	   commented	   on	   the	   relationship	  between	  higher	   educational	   attainment	  of	   low	   income	  women	  and	  improved	   social	   status	   in	   their	   families.	   A	   number	   of	   female	   key	  informants	   linked	   better	   educational	   attainment	  with	   employment	  opportunities,	   which	   in	   turn	   they	   saw	   as	   generating	   income	   and	  hence	  giving	  women	  more	  power	  in	  the	  family	  especially	  in	  times	  of	  financial	   need.	   Some	   illustrated	   their	   point	   with	   observations	  comparing	   educated	   and	   non-­‐educated	   low	   income	   women.	   One	  female	   teacher	   in	   a	   school	   in	   an	   informal	   area	   with	   a	   Palestinian	  majority	   talked	   about	   education,	   especially	   of	  women,	   being	  more	  embedded	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  what	  she	  termed	  "the	  original	  people"	  in	  the	  camp	  who	  are	  mostly	  Palestinians.	  The	  key	  informant	  described	  the	  implication	  of	  increased	  education	  of	  women	  among	  the	  original	  residents	  in	  the	  camp:	  	  "As	  a	  result	  of	  their	  education,	  women	  are	  more	  independent	  and	  many	  choose	  to	  help	   their	  husbands	  out	   financially	   through	  their	  work,	   especially	   if	   they	   are	   experiencing	   a	   difficult	   economic	  situation"	  (KI-­‐5).	  	  The	  increased	  social	  status	  of	  women	  as	  a	  result	  of	  better	  education	  was	   echoed	   in	   the	   views	   of	   a	   female	   key	   informant	   doctor	  with	   a	  private	   clinic	   in	   another	   informal	   area.	   She	   said	   that	   in	   this	   area	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there	   are	   many	   illiterate	   women	   and	   a	   minority	   of	   women	   in	   the	  area	   have	   gone	   to	   college:	   "These	   educated	   women	   have	   power	  
among	   their	   families	   especially	   among	   women	   who	   listen	   to	   their	  
opinion"	  (KI-­‐3).	  Another	   female	   key	   informant	   described	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	  powerlessness	   of	   many	   low	   income	   women	   who	   she	   has	   come	  across	  though	  the	  course	  of	  her	  work	  in	  family	  planning.	  Many	  girls	  leave	  school	  early	  to	  get	  married	  young	  and	  many	  of	  those	  have	  no	  control	  over	  their	  lives:	  	  "Because	   many	   poor	   women	   marry	   very	   young,	   they	   have	   no	  decision	  and	  usually	  the	  decisions	  involving	  their	  life	  are	  taken	  by	  the	  husband,	  the	  mother	  in	  law	  or	  the	  mother"	  (KI-­‐2).	  	  
The	   Relationship	   between	   Educational	   Attainment	   and	   Women’s	  
Health	  In	   the	   view	   of	   a	   key	   informant	   in	   the	   government	   primary	   health	  directorate	  in	  Aleppo,	  higher	  educational	  attainment	  is	  synonymous	  with	   a	   higher	   age	   of	   marriage	   and	   hence	   avoiding	   the	   health	  repercussions	  associated	  with	  teenage	  pregnancies:	  	  
"Educated	   women	   have	   better	   decision	   making.	   Because	   of	   the	  higher	   level	   of	   education,	   the	   age	   of	   marriage	   is	   higher.	   As	   you	  know	   there	   are	   many	   harmful	   effects	   associated	   with	   teenage	  pregnancy.	  We	  see	  this	  all	  the	  time"	  (KI-­‐6)	  	  Whilst	   waiting	   in	   the	   private	   gynaecology	   hospital	   to	   interview	   a	  key	   informant,	   I	   observed	   an	   example	   that	   illustrates	   the	  interconnection	   of	   factors	   that	   influence	   the	   health	   of	   low	   income	  women.	  Poverty,	  early	  age	  of	  marriage,	  low	  educational	  attainment,	  partner	   violence	   and	   self-­‐harm	   are	   all	   facets	   of	   this	   one	   case.	   This	  observation	   (an	   extract	   from	   my	   fieldwork	   research	   diary)	   is	  presented	  in	  box	  1.1.	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Box 1.1: Extract from Fieldwork Observation Diary:  
in the Waiting Room of a Private Women’s Hospital, 28 April 2011 I	  waited	   for	  my	   interview	  with	   the	  midwife	   in	  a	  small	  consultation	  room.	  From	  it,	  I	  could	  see	  through	  the	  partially	  open	  door	  scores	  of	  women	  entering	  and	  leaving	  the	  large	  waiting	  area	  of	  this	  small	  yet	  very	   busy	   private	   gynaecology	   hospital	   in	   this	   formal	   yet	   poor	  neighbourhood	   in	   Aleppo.	   I	   could	   see	   that	   the	   midwife	   was	   busy	  with	  a	  patient	  in	  the	  consultation	  room	  next	  door.	  I	  was	  taking	  some	  notes	  when	  a	  middle	  aged	  woman	  seemingly	  in	  her	  late	  forties	  came	  and	  sat	  opposite	  me.	  She	  wore	  a	  black	  scarf	  and	  a	  long	  black	  dress.	  Her	   eyes	   looked	   tired	   and	  her	   expression	  was	   tense.	   A	   seven	   year	  old	  boy	  kept	  peeping	  through	  the	  slightly	  open	  door	  from	  the	  larger	  linked	  waiting	  room.	  I	  knew	  later	  that	  he	  was	  her	  son.	  I	  was	  writing	  in	  my	  research	  diary	  when	  she	  approached	  me	  and	  asked	  what	  I	  did	  for	  a	  living.	  I	  said	  that	  I	  was	  a	  health	  researcher	  and	  I	  was	  here	  to	  do	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  midwife.	  She	  came	  and	  sat	  next	  to	  me	  and	  said	  "I	  am	  waiting	  for	  my	  daughter.	  She	  could	  have	  killed	  herself	  and	  her	  baby.	  Earlier	  today	  she	  took	  20	  pills	  after	  a	  fight	  with	  her	  mother	  in	  law".	  She	  asked	  me	  "do	  you	  know	  whether	  these	  pills	  will	  harm	  her	  and	  the	  foetus?	  She	  is	  4	  months	  pregnant".	   I	  asked	  her	  if	  she	  knew	  the	   name	   of	   the	  medicine	   or	  whether	   she	   could	   describe	   it	   to	  me.	  She	   could	   only	   tell	   me	   that	   the	   colour	   of	   its	   packaging	   was	   red.	   I	  tried	   to	   assure	   her	   "I	   am	   sure	   she	  will	   be	   fine.	   It	   is	   good	   that	   you	  have	  managed	  to	  come	  here	  in	  time".	  She	  replied	  "She	  is	  foolish.	  She	  is	   taking	   revenge	   of	   her	   mother	   in	   law	   and	   husband	   by	   trying	   to	  harm	  herself	   and	  her	  baby".	   She	   then	   told	  me	   that	   she	  had	  been	  a	  widow	   for	   four	   years	   and	   that	   Huda8	   is	   her	   eldest	   amongst	   ten	  children,	   the	   youngest	  was	   the	   7	   years	   old	   boy	  who	   kept	   peeping	  through	  the	  door. It was at this minute when the midwife came out of 
the consultation room with Huda, the daughter who was completely 
veiled but had her Niqāb off her face. She was pretty and looked so 
young and vulnerable. The midwife wrote her a prescription and told	  her	  with	  an	  authoritative	  tone	  never	  to	  repeat	  what	  she	  did	  again	  as	  by	  doing	  this	  she	  might	  cause	  irreversible	  damage	  to	  her	  uterus	  and	  then	   she	   would	   be	   useless	   to	   her	   husband,	   who	   would	   marry	  another	  woman	  and	  disregard	  her.	  Huda	  kept	  saying	  that	  she	  had	  no	  idea	   that	   this	  medicine	  would	  harm	  her	  or	  her	   foetus	  and	   that	   she	  had	  done	  this	  to	  take	  revenge	  of	  her	  husband	  and	  her	  mother	  in	  law.	  She	  said	  that	  "both	  have	  beaten	  me	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  show	  them	  that	  I	  can	  also	  do	  something".	  She	  started	  recalling	  what	  others	  told	  her	  about	  the	  danger	  of	  what	  she	  had	  done.	  She	  looked	  very	  childlike	  in	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her	  manners	  and	  talk.	  The	  midwife	  later	  told	  me	  that	  Huda	  was	  only	  17	  year	  old	  and	  already	  had	  a	  1.5	  year	  old	  son	  which	  made	  her	  15	  when	   she	   first	  married	  her	  husband,	   12	   years	  her	   senior.	   She	   told	  me	   that	   Huda	   had	   less	   than	   6	   years	   of	   formal	   education.	   This	  experienced	  midwife	  who	  was	  the	  first	  key	  informant	  I	  interviewed.	  She	  commented:	  "You	  see	   illiteracy	   is	   the	  cause	  of	  many	  problems,	  social,	   health	   and	   otherwise.	  When	   a	  woman	   is	   illiterate	   she	   does	  not	  care	  about	  others,	  herself	  or	  the	  environment	  around	  her".	  She	  commented	   that	   Huda	   had	   been	   lucky	   as	   she	   could	   get	   to	   the	  hospital	   in	   time.	   She	   went	   on	   to	   say	   "we	   see	   all	   the	   time	   poor	  uneducated	   women	   who	   cannot	   leave	   the	   house.	   Sometimes	   they	  are	  locked	  in	  by	  the	  husband	  or	  mother	  in	  law	  and	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  leave	  the	  house".	  	  
Conclusions of Findings The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  key	  informants	  of	  different	  positions	   in	   Aleppo	   perceived	   social	   determinants	   of	   health,	  especially	   gender	   and	   neighbourhood	   health	   inequalities.	   The	  findings	   point	   to	   a	   society	   increasingly	   divided	   into	   winners	   and	  losers	  with	  poor	  women	  in	  deprived	  informal	  neighbourhoods	  being	  the	   most	   disadvantaged.	   These	   confirm	   findings	   from	   previous	  studies	   in	   Aleppo	  which	   identified	   low	   income	  married	  women	   as	  bearing	  a	  disproportionate	  burden	  of	  ill	  health	  and	  disability	  (Asfar	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Fouad	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Maziak	  et	  al.	  2002;	  Maziak	  2009).	  	  The	   findings	   showed	   key	   informants’	   accounts	   of	   the	   social	  determinants	   of	   health	   of	  married	  women	   to	   be	   rich	   in	   detail	   and	  included	   references	   to	   both	   "compositional"	   and	   "contextual"	  features.	   Therefore,	   in	   their	   explanation	   of	   health	   inequalities	  between	  neighbourhoods,	  key	  informants	  placed	  equal	  emphasis	  on	  compositional	   and	   contextual	   social	   determinants	   of	   health,	  especially	   the	   interplay	   between	   upstream	   socioeconomic	   policies,	  neighbourhood	   resources,	   social	   composition	   and	   individual	  characteristics	   such	   as	   education	   and	   individual	   socioeconomic	  position.	   The	   interviews	   with	   key	   informants	   revealed	   the	  interweaving	   of	   a	  multitude	   of	   social	   determinants	   that	   influenced	  health	   outcomes,	   especially	   of	   women	   in	   informal	   settlements.	  Examples	   of	   those	   mentioned	   include,	   but	   are	   not	   restricted	   to,	  poverty,	   low	   educational	   attainment,	   marriage	   at	   an	   early	   age,	  partner	   violence,	   gender	   restrictions	   on	   access	   to	   healthcare,	  proximity	   of	   housing	   to	   industry,	   poor	   housing	   quality,	   lack	   of	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educational	   facilities	  and	  health	  services	   in	   informal	  areas,	  and	  the	  socioeconomic	  inequalities	  created	  by	  neoliberal	  policies,	  especially	  in	  education.	  	  Studies	   on	   place	   and	   health	   have	   distinguished	   between	  contextual	  and	  compositional	   factors	  and	   their	  relative	   importance	  in	  explaining	  health	  inequalities	  between	  areas.	  This	  applies	  to	  both	  conceptual	   and	   empirical	   studies.	   The	   findings	   from	   this	   study	  suggest	   that	   the	   characteristics	   of	   individuals	   (compositional	  features)	   and	   the	   contextual	   characteristics	   of	   neighbourhoods	   in	  which	   they	   live	   are	   highly	   interrelated,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   distinguish	   them	   from	   each	   other.	   Such	   findings	   are	   in	  line	  with	  work	  by	  Sally	  Macintyre	  and	  her	  colleagues,	  who	  pointed	  to	   the	   difficulties	   of	   disentangling	   compositional	   and	   contextual	  effects	  in	  empirical	  studies	  (Macintyre	  et	  al.	  2002).	  The	  most	  quoted	  example	  used	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point	  is	  that	  from	  research	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  features	  of	  ethnic	  density	  (neighbourhood	  concentration	   of	   people	   belonging	   to	   a	   particular	  minority	   group)	  and	  health.	   I	   find	  the	  questions	  asked	   initially	  by	   	   (Curtis	  and	  Rees	  Jones	  1998)	  highly	  relevant.	  Do	  we	  interpret	  ethnic	  concentration	  as	  a	   compositional	   characteristic	   resulting	   from	   aggregation	   and	  related	  to	  a	  certain	  ethnicity	  or	  race?	  Or	  is	  it	  better	  to	  interpret	  it	  as	  a	   contextual	   social	   characteristic	   associated	   with	   a	   certain	  community?	  The	  narratives	  of	  key	  informants	  in	  this	  study	  are	  rich	  in	   examples	   of	   cases	   of	   health	   inequalities	   between	   similarly	   poor	  informal	   areas.	   In	  most	   cases	   they	   based	   their	   perception	   of	   these	  differences	  on	  the	  social	  composition	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  the	  social	  norms	   of	   an	   area.	   But,	   is	   the	   reportedly	   better	   educational	  attainment	   of	   Palestinian	   women	   in	   Palestinian	   informal	   areas	   a	  compositional	   feature	   resulting	   from	   the	  clustering	  of	  Palestinians,	  who	   are	   relatively	   better	   off	   financially	   and	  who	  place	  more	   value	  on	  education	  of	  women,	  or	   is	   it	   a	   contextual	   feature	   related	   to	   the	  presence	  of	  better	  schools	  in	  Palestinian	  areas	  such	  as	  those	  funded	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Relief	  and	  Works	  Agency	  (UNRWA)?	  And	  how	  have	   upstream	   contextual	   factors	   such	   as	   neoliberal	   policies	  adopted	  by	  the	  Syrian	  state	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  interacted	  with	  both	  compositional	   and	   neighbourhood	   contextual	   characteristics	   to	  influence	  social	  determinants	  of	  health?	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  neoliberal	  policies	  in	  Syria	  have	  deepened	  socioeconomic	  and	  health	  inequalities	   and	   hence	   further	   marginalised	   the	   urban	   poor,	  particularly	   women	   (El	   Laithy	   &	   AbuIsmail	   2005).	   Indeed,	   key	  informants	   in	   this	   study	   alluded	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   such	   policies	   on	  public	   education	   and	   hence	   the	   disproportionate	   negative	   impacts	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on	   the	   urban	   poor,	   especially	   in	   informal	   and	   poor	   formal	  neighbourhoods.	  	  Without	   exception,	   all	   key	   informants	   cited	   illiteracy	   and	   low	  educational	   attainment	   as	   the	   main	   challenge	   facing	   poor	   women	  not	  only	  in	  informal	  areas	  but	  also	  in	  many	  low	  income	  formal	  areas.	  This	  confirms	  the	  findings	  from	  interviews	  with	  27	  women	  living	  in	  informal	  areas.	  All	  of	  the	  participants	  from	  informal	  areas	  had	  very	  low	   educational	   attainment	   (less	   than	   6	   years	   of	   schooling).	   This	  was	   also	   true	   for	   more	   than	   half	   of	   those	   from	   the	   formal	   areas,	  especially	  those	  living	  in	  the	  poor	  formal	  areas	  of	  Aleppo.	  It	  is	  also	  in	  line	   with	   previous	   studies	   in	   Aleppo.	   In	   their	   survey	   of	   a	  representative	   sample	   of	   1,021	   adults	   in	   informal	   areas	   of	   Aleppo	  (46%	  males,	  mean	  age	  34±12,	  age	  range	  18–65	  years),	  Maziak	  and	  colleagues	   showed	   that	   79.7%	   of	   women	   in	   informal	   areas	   were	  illiterate	  or	  had	  a	  formal	  education	  of	  6	  years	  or	   less	  (Maziak	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  Key	   informants	   associated	   better	   education	   of	   women	   with	  empowerment	   through	   increased	   independence	  and	  employability,	  better	   use	   of	   health	   services,	   particularly	   family	   planning	   and	  vaccination	  programmes	   for	  children	   -­‐	  all	   factors	  mentioned	   in	   the	  literature	   to	   explain	   the	   positive	   relationship	   between	   women’s	  education	  and	  better	  health	  outcomes	  (Adler	  et	  al.	  2002;	  Al	  Riyami	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Basu	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Caldwell	  and	  McDonald	  1982;	  Cleland	  et	   al.	   1988;	   Nankabirwa	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Additionally,	   many	   studies	  show	  the	  strong	  association	  between	  maternal	  education	  and	  child	  mortality	  (Boyle	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Gakidou	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Levine	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Ozaltin	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Evidence	  suggests	  that	  a	  1-­‐year	  increment	  in	  the	  mother's	  education	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  7–9%	  reduction	  in	  mortality	  in	   under	   5s	   (Cleland	   et	   al.	   1988).	   The	  WHO	  Commission	   on	   Social	  Determinants	   of	   Health	   emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   increasing	  educational	  attainment	  to	  reduce	  disparities	  in	  health	  (Marmot	  et	  al.	  2008).	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  education	  was	  also	  stressed	  by	  the	   UN	   Millennium	   Development	   Goals,	   with	   Goal	   2	   calling	   for	  universal	  primary	  education	  (UN	  2010).	  Neighbourhood	  based	  measures	  of	  socioeconomic	  status	  are	  not	  available	   in	   Syria.	   However,	   even	   if	   these	   data	   existed,	   using	  neighbourhood	   measures	   of	   deprivation	   would	   usually	   mask	  significant	  inequalities	  within	  the	  area	  and	  in	  turn	  could	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  unsuitable	  policies	  targeting	  these	  areas.	  Hence,	  key	  informants’	  accounts	  of	   socioeconomic	  and	  environmental	  differences	  between	  and	  within	  neighbourhoods	  are	  useful	  to	  elucidate	  the	  mechanisms	  for	   health	   inequalities	   between	   and	   within	   what	   appears	   to	   be	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homogenous	   neighbourhoods.	   Understanding	   these	   differences	   as	  well	  as	  neighbourhood	  characteristics	  that	  can	  influence	  health	  will	  be	  useful	   for	  planning	  and	  policy.	  Macintyre	  &	  Ellaway	  distinguish	  five	   neighbourhood	   features	   that	   form	   what	   they	   call	   the	  "opportunity	   structures"	   that	   might	   directly	   promote	   or	   damage	  health.	   These	   include	   physical	   characteristics	   of	   areas	   (e.g.	   air	  quality);	  the	  presence	  of	  environments	  at	  home,	  work	  and	  play	  that	  support	   a	   healthy	   lifestyle	   (e.g.	   play	   areas	   or	   housing	   quality);	   the	  presence	   of	   and	   proximity	   to	   quality	   services	   available	   to	   all	   (e.g.	  schools	   and	   transport);	   socio-­‐cultural	   features	   (e.g.	   social	   fabric)	  and	  the	  area	  reputation	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  views	  of	  residents	  and	  outsiders	   (Macintyre	   &	   Ellaway	   2003).	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   two	  urban	   planners,	   other	   key	   informants	   did	   not	   comment	   on	   the	  physical	  contextual	  features	  of	  places	  (e.g.	  pollution	  or	  poor	  quality	  housing).	   But	   these	   issues	   came	   up	   prominently	   in	   previous	  interviews	  with	  health	  service	  providers	  and	  lay	  people	  in	  informal	  settlements	   in	   Aleppo	   (Hammal	   et	   al.	   2005).	   This	   is	   in	   line	   with	  earlier	  studies	  on	  lay	  understanding	  of	  social	  inequalities	  in	  health.	  For	  example,	   in	   their	   study	  using	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methods	  and	  exploring	  and	  comparing	  the	  views	  of	  people	  living	  in	  contrasting	  socio-­‐economic	  neighbourhoods,	  Popay	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  features	  of	  areas,	  such	  as	  pollution	  and	  housing	  quality,	  were	  twice	  as	   likely	   to	   be	   highlighted	   as	   explanatory	   factors	   of	   health	  inequalities	   than	   individual	   features,	   especially	   those	   related	   to	  health	   behaviours	   such	   as	   smoking	   or	   drinking.	   However,	   the	  authors	   rightly	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   questions	   asked	   about	   the	  perceived	  causes	  of	  health	   inequalities	  with	  their	   focus	  on	  features	  of	   places	   might	   have	   influenced	   people’s	   responses	   (Popay	   et	   al.	  1998).	   This	   was	   not	   the	   case	   in	   the	   present	   study	   since	   the	  questions	  asked	  were	  relatively	  open	  and	  hence	  respondents	  were	  free	  to	   focus	  on	  any	  compositional	  or	  contextual	   features	   that	   they	  deemed	   more	   important	   for	   the	   generation	   of	   inequalities	   in	  women’s	  health	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  areas.	  	  This	  paper	  explored	  the	  views	  of	   ten	  key	   informants	   in	  Aleppo	  of	   the	   compositional	   and	   contextual	   features	   that	   might	   result	   in	  health	   inequalities	  between	  or	  within	  areas.	  The	   findings	   illustrate	  the	   interconnectedness	   of	   compositional	   and	   contextual	   features	  when	   trying	   to	   explain	   health	   inequalities	   among	  married	  women	  living	   in	  formal	  and	  informal	  areas	   in	  Aleppo.	  The	  main	   limitations	  of	   this	   study	   are	   the	   relatively	   small	   number	   of	   key	   informants	  interviewed	  and	  the	  brevity	  of	  the	  interviews.	  Besides,	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  conducted	  at	  a	  turbulent	  time	  in	  Syria	  when	  people	  might	  have	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understandably	  felt	  more	  nervous	  to	  participate	  in	  research	  studies,	  especially	  those	  linked	  to	  Western	  academic	  institutions.	  This	  might	  be	   the	   reason	   why	   two	   of	   those	   approached	   to	   be	   interviewed	  refused	   to	   participate	   in	   this	   study	   despite	   agreeing	   initially.	  However,	   despite	   the	   limited	   number	   of	   key	   informants	  interviewed,	   there	   was	   diversity	   in	   their	   representation,	  organisational	   affiliation	   and	   gender.	   This	   has	   shown	   itself	   in	   the	  different	  and	  sometimes	  contrasting	  views	  on	  a	  number	  of	  themes,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  classification	  of	  informal	  areas.	  In	  a	  country	  like	  Syria,	   with	   a	   weak	   tradition	   of	   using	   qualitative	   inquiry	   in	   public	  health,	   this	   brief	   qualitative	   study	   undertaken	   at	   a	   time	   of	   crisis	  offers	   a	   rare	   in-­‐depth	   glimpse	   of	   what	   an	   exploration	   of	  compositional	   and	   contextual	   factors	   looks	   like	   and	   how	   they	  interact	   to	   disadvantage	   poor	   women,	   especially	   those	   living	   in	  informal	   neighbourhood.	   The	   findings	   from	   the	   key	   informant	  interviews	   will	   be	   triangulated	   with	   those	   from	   interviews	   with	  married	   women	   in	   formal	   and	   informal	   areas	   as	   well	   as	   findings	  from	  a	  multilevel	  analysis	  of	   survey	  data	   in	  order	   to	  provide	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  urban	  and	  health	   inequalities	   in	  Aleppo.	  Together	   these	   findings	   will	   contribute	   to	   an	   evidence	   base	   for	  policies	   aimed	   at	   improving	   the	   health	   and	  wellbeing	   of	   residents,	  especially	  women	  in	  informal	  settlements	  and	  poor	  neighbourhoods	  in	  Syria.	  Clearly,	  the	  findings	  from	  this	  study	  underscore	  the	  urgent	  need	   to	   focus	   on	   education.	   The	   conditions	   of	   the	   urban	   poor,	  especially	   uneducated	   low	   income	   married	   women,	   as	   a	  disempowered	   and	  marginalised	   group	   can	  only	  deepen	   the	   crises	  of	  health	  and	  urban	  injustice.	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Contested Heritage? Gentrification 
and Authoritarian Resilience in 
Damascus 
Yannick Sudermann 
Introduction On	  20th	  December	  2008	  both	  The	  Guardian	  and	  The	  Financial	  Times	  devoted	   articles	   to	   boutique	   hotels	   in	   the	   old	   city	   of	   Damascus,	  Syria.	   The	   opening	   of	   small	   five-­‐star	   hotels	   in	   formerly	   declining	  neighbourhoods	   was	   celebrated	   by	   officials,	   members	   of	   the	   local	  middle	   classes	   and	   tourists	   alike.	   Boutique	   hotels,	   small	   luxury	  hotels	   situated	   in	   opulently	   renovated	   courtyard	   houses	   and	  targeted	  at	   international	  business	   travellers	  and	  moneyed	   tourists,	  seem	   to	   be	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	   advancing	   branding	   of	   Old	  Damascus.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  theme-­‐restaurants	  for	  the	  country’s	  new	  middle-­‐classes	  and	  tourists	  have	  mushroomed	  throughout	   the	  old	  city	  (Salamandra	  2004).	  Additionally,	  after	  2002,	  some	  sections	  of	  the	  historic	  suq,	  most	  prominently	  Suq	  al-­‐Hamidiyya,	  were	  given	  a	  facelift.	  In	  their	  search	  for	  ‘authenticity’	  and	  heritage,	  parts	  of	  the	  country’s	   new	   middle	   classes	   now	   return	   to	   Old	   Damascus,	   often	  just	  temporarily	  for	  dining	  and	  other	  leisure	  activities.	  Furthermore,	  more	  recently	  and	  so	  far	  on	  a	  small	  scale,	  some	  individuals	  consider	  living	   in	   the	   old	   town	   to	   be	   in	   fashion,	   and	   push	   into	   historic	  neighbourhoods	  mostly	   inhabited	  by	  poor	  migrants	   of	   rural	   origin	  or	  their	  descendants.	  Sham	  al-­qadima	  is	  now	  the	  Damascene	  middle	  classes’	  ‘place	  to	  be’	  which	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  evolving	  gentrification.	  	  In	   Old	   Damascus	   the	   political	   starting	   point	   for	   gentrification	  which	  Hackworth	   (2002:	   815)	   defines	   as	   ‘the	   production	   of	   urban	  space	   for	   progressively	   more	   affluent	   users’	   and	   which	   produces	  and	  results	  in	  realignments	  of	  urban	  policies,	  is	  the	  effort	  of	  Syria’s	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formerly	   ‘populist	   authoritarian	   state’	   (Hinnebusch	   1995)	   under	  Bashar	   al-­‐Asad	   to	   survive	   by	   adapting	   to	   new	   conditions	   through	  what	   has	   been	   called	   “authoritarian	   upgrading;”	   this	   practice	  ‘combines	   tried-­‐and-­‐true	   strategies	   of	   the	   past—coercion,	  surveillance,	   patronage,	   corruption,	   and	   personalism—with	  innovations’	   (Heydemann	   2007:	   3)1	   e.g.	   by	  modifying	  mechanisms	  of	  co-­‐optation.	  It	  also	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  shift	   in	  the	  social	  base	  of	  the	   state	   from	   its	   former	   “populist	   coalition”	  of	   lower	   social	   strata	  toward	  upper	  strata	  on	  which	  the	  regime’s	  “post-­‐populist”	  political-­‐economy	  strategy	  comes	  to	  depend.	  	  Focusing	   on	   Old	   Damascus	   –	   which	   since	   1979	   is	   listed	   as	   a	  World	  Heritage	  Site	  –	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  article	   is	   to	  demonstrate	  how	   granting	   preferential	   access	   to	   profitable	   businesses	   sectors	  like	   tourism	   and	   real	   estate	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   one	   such	   innovative	  means	  of	  authoritarian	  upgrading.	  By	  examining	  in	  detail	  a	  hotspot	  of	   gentrification	   within	   the	   old	   city	   this	   paper	   addresses	   the	  overarching	   question:	   to	   what	   extent	   does	   gentrification	   in	   Old	  Damascus	   contribute	   to	   authoritarian	   upgrading?	   Furthermore,	   it	  will	   investigate	   how	   different	   stakeholders	   like	   investors,	   former	  residents,	   gentrifiers	   or	   the	   local	   administration	   lay	   claim	   to	  Damascus’	  contested	  urban	  heritage.	  	  The	   first	   section	   aims	   at	   reviewing	   relevant	   literature	   and	  presenting	   the	   employed	   key	   concepts,	   namely	   gentrification	   and	  authoritarian	   resilience.	   The	   second	   section	   is	   devoted	   to	   the	  geopolitical	  and	  domestic	  conditions	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	   timing	   of	   gentrification	   in	   Old	   Damascus.	   Section	   three	  investigates	   the	   production	   of	   gentrification	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  actors	   and	   the	   process	   as	   well	   as	   common	   conflicts	   between	   the	  different	   stakeholders.	   Section	   four	   deals	  with	   the	   interplay	   of	   the	  process	  of	  gentrification	  and	  privileges	  conferred	  to	  members	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  and	  carefully	  selected	  supporters.	  Thereby,	   it	   is	  shown	  how	  gentrification	  functions	  both	  as	  an	  investment	  opportunity	  and	  a	   part	   of	   an	   exclusive,	   consumption-­‐orientated	   way	   of	   life	   for	   the	  country’s	  ascending	  classes.	  Finally,	  the	  last	  section	  summarizes	  the	  findings	  and	  concludes	  with	  a	  short	  outlook	  on	  prospects	  of	   future	  gentrification	   in	   Old	   Damascus	   particularly	   regarding	   the	   current	  uprising.	  The	   presented	   data	   is	   part	   of	   my	   PhD	   research,2	   which	  investigates	   the	   interplay	   of	   gentrification	   and	   authoritarian	  resilience	   in	   the	   Syrian	   capital	   based	   on	   several	   historic	  neighbourhoods	  within	   and	   beyond	   the	   city	  walls	   (intra	   and	   extra	  muros).	   This	   paper	   deals	   with	   gentrification	   in	   one	   of	   these	   case	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studies,	  al-­‐Qaymariya,	  a	  neighbourhood	  intra	  muros	  which	  is	  located	  west	   of	   the	   Christian	   quarter	   Bab	   Tuma	   in	   the	   Northeast	   of	   the	  walled	   old	   town	   of	   Damascus	   where	   most	   Old	   Damascene	   cafes,	  restaurants	  and	  boutique	  hotels	  can	  be	  found.	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Gentrification Since	   the	   19th	   century,	   western-­‐style	   quarters	   were	   built	   outside	  the	   historic	   centres	   of	   many	   Middle	   Eastern	   cities.	   Therefore,	  research	   on	   the	   dualism	   between	   the	   historic	   old	   city	   and	   the	  formerly	  colonial	  new	  town	  was	  undertaken	  (Heineberg	  2006:	  288-­‐295).	   Dettmann	   (1969),	   bases	   his	   model	   of	   the	   ‘Islamic-­‐oriental	  city’3	   on	   research	   in	   Damascus.	   He	   identifies	   the	   construction	   of	   a	  French	  commercial	  quarter	  west	  of	  the	  old	  city	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  ‘bi-­‐polarity’	  between	  the	  traditional	  old	  town	  and	  a	  modern	  new	  town.	   Likewise,	   Seger	  1975	  emphasises	   the	   existence	  of	   two	   cores	  within	   the	   centre	   of	   Teheran,	   first	   the	   suq	   in	   the	   old	   city;	   and	  second,	   the	   modern	   CBD	   (Central	   Business	   District)	   and	   Ehlers	  (1993)	   points	   out	   the	   breaking	   up	   of	   the	   traditional	   oriental	   city	  caused	  by	  new	  city	  extensions.	   ‘The	   “old	   city”	   stood	   for	   “tradition”	  and	   “local”	   life’	   while	   in	   the	   new	   city	   ‘the	   new	   public	   buildings,	  commercial	   centers,	   and	   residential	   neighbourhoods	   created	   an	  urban	  iconography	  of	  the	  imported	  “modern”’	  (Shechter	  and	  Yacobi	  2005:	  183).	  However,	  modern	   lifestyles	  have	  pervaded	  historic	  old	  towns	   throughout	   the	   Middle	   East,	   facilitated	   by	   various	   state-­‐led	  gentrification	  strategies.	  Early	  definitions	  of	  gentrification	  emphasise	  its	  direct	  impact	  on	  a	   residential	   neighbourhood’s	   class	   character	   and	   referred	   to	   the	  taking-­‐over	   of	   working-­‐class	   housing	   by	   middle-­‐class	   residents	  (Glass	  1964;	  Smith	  1982).	  Lees,	  Slater	  and	  Wyly	  (2008:	  xv)	  mention	  the	   commercial	   use	   of	   an	   area	   by	  members	   of	   the	  middle	   class	   as	  alternative	   or	   an	   addition	   to	   a	   purely	   residential	   use	   of	   former	  working-­‐class	   neighbourhoods.	   Including	   ‘commercial	   use’	   into	  definitions	   of	   gentrification	   facilitates	   the	   use	   of	   gentrification	  theory	   in	   contexts	   in	   which	   commercialization	   rather	   than	  residential	  upgrading	  unfolds,	  and	  has	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  both	  the	   social	   and	   the	  built	   environment	  of	   a	  neighbourhood,	   as	   is	   the	  case	  in	  the	  Syrian	  capital,	  Damascus.	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At	  first	  gentrification	  became	  known	  as	  a	   ‘sporadic,	  quaint,	  and	  local	   anomaly	   in	   the	   housing	   markets	   of	   some	   command-­‐center	  cities’	   (Smith	   2002:	   427).	   Over	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   however,	  gentrification,	   now	   a	   ‘thoroughly	   generalized’	   (ibid:	   336)	   global	  urban	   strategy,	   ‘has	   been	   reminiscent	   of	   earlier	   waves	   of	   colonial	  and	   mercantile	   expansion’	   (Atkinson	   and	   Bridge	   2005:	   2).	  Worldwide,	   centrally-­‐located	   neighbourhoods	   are	   literally	  conquered	   by	  members	   of	   the	  middle	   and	   upper	   class.	   Therefore,	  Neil	   Smith	   (1996)	   compares	   the	  advance	  of	   gentrification	  with	   the	  advance	   of	   the	   frontier	   in	   19th	   century’s	   American	  West	   (189).	   In	  addition,	   due	   to	   their	   ‘new	   class’	   occupations	   and	   their	  cosmopolitanism,	   gentrifiers	   are	   described	   as	   a	   colonial	   elite	  (Atkinson	  and	  Bridge	  2005:	  3).	  	  Much	  scholarly	  attention	  had	  been	  paid	   to	  an	  apparent	  shift	   in	  consumer	  preferences	   celebrated	   as	   urban	   renaissance	   or	   ‘back	   to	  the	   city’	   movement	   (Laska	   and	   Spain	   1980).	   Neil	   Smith	   (1979)	  refuted	   the	   neoclassical	   consumer	   sovereignty	   explanations	   of	  gentrification	   as	   these	   assume	   that	   ‘suburbanization	   reflects	   the	  preference	   for	   space’	   and	   that	   gentrification	   ‘is	   explained	   as	   the	  result	   of	   an	   alteration	   of	   preferences	   and/or	   a	   change	   in	   the	  constraints	   determining	   which	   preferences	   will	   or	   can	   be	  implemented’	   (539).	   Supported	   by	   empirical	   evidence	   from	   three	  gentrifying	   neighbourhoods	   in	   different	   US	   cities,	   the	   author	   was	  able	   to	   show	   that	   hardly	   30	   percent	   of	   the	   gentrifiers	   had	   been	  suburbanites,	   whereas	   the	   majority	   had	   been	   inner-­‐city	   dwellers	  (539f).	   He	   further	  warns	   that	   explanations	   of	   gentrification	  which	  basically	  focus	  on	  gentrifiers’	  actions	  and	  thereby	  ignore	  the	  role	  of	  other	   actors	   are	   fundamentally	   flawed	   (Smith	   1979:	   540).	   Smith	  therefore	   advocates	   a	   broader	   theory	   of	   gentrification	   which	  incorporates	  the	  roles	  of	  both,	  consumers	  and	  producers.	  ‘And	  when	  this	   is	   done,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   needs	   of	   production-­‐	   in	   particular	  the	   need	   to	   earn	   profit-­‐	   are	   a	   more	   decisive	   initiative	   behind	  gentrification	  than	  consumer	  preference’	  (540).	  	  Until	  the	  late	  1980s,	  causes	  of	  gentrification	  were	  at	  the	  centre	  of	   scholarly	   attention	   and	   this	   was,	   as	   Slater	   (2006)	   emphasises	  ‘often	   in	   response	   to	   the	   clear	   injustice	   of	   the	   displacement	   of	  working-­‐class	  residents’	  (740).	  During	  the	  following	  years,	  however,	  the	  focus	  of	  many	  researchers	  shifted	  from	  the	  working	  class	  to	  the	  gentrifiers.	  Gentrification	  was	   reinterpreted	  as	   symbolic	   resistance	  to	   faceless	   suburbia	   (Caulfield	   1989),	   and	   the	   aestheticization	   of	   a	  bohemian	  lifestyle	  was	  of	  high	  academic	  interest	  (Ley	  2003).	  Other	  authors	  praised	  gentrification	  as	  the	  appropriate	  strategy	  to	  counter	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urban	   poverty	   and	   to	   ‘regenerate’	   declining	   neighbourhoods	   (e.g.	  Byrne	   2003).	   Consequently,	   scholarly	   and	   public	   attention	   was	  diverted	   from	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   gentrification,	   such	   as	   social	  inequality	   and	   the	   displacement	   of	   low-­‐income	   residents	   towards	  gentrifying	   individuals,	   mostly	   members	   of	   the	   middle	   and	   upper	  class,	   and	   their	   individualistic	   cosmopolitan	   lifestyle(s)	   (Slater	  2006).	  In	  this	  regard	  Neil	  Smith	  warned	  as	  early	  as1979:	  	  ‘To	   explain	   gentrification	   according	   to	   the	   gentrifier’s	   actions	  alone,	   while	   ignoring	   the	   role	   of	   builders,	   developers,	   landlords,	  mortgage	   lenders,	   government	   agencies,	   real	   estate	   agents,	   and	  tenants,	  is	  excessively	  narrow’	  (540).	  	  In	   post-­‐colonial	   Damascus	   affluent	   inhabitants	   had	   voluntarily	   left	  the	   old	   city	   to	   live	   in	   one	   of	   the	   newer	   quarters,	   which	   were	  considered	   to	   be	   the	   symbol	   of	   a	  modern,	  Western	   lifestyle	   –	   Old	  Damascus’	  narrow	  streets	  and	  traditional	  courtyard	  house	  being	  the	  antithesis	  (Dettmann	  1969:	  100ff).	  Using	  the	  term	  gentrification	  for	  one	  of	  the	  first	  times	  in	  the	  Damascene	  context,	  Pfaffenbach	  (2004:	  67)	  noticed	  an	   increasing	  back-­‐to-­‐the-­‐[old]-­‐city	  movement4	  of	  elite	  Damascenes	   which	   started	   already	   during	   the	   1970s.	   The	   author	  explained	   gentrification	   in	   Old	   Damascus	   based	   on	   changing	  consumer	  preferences	  of	  mostly	  Christian	  Damascenes.	  Salamandra	  (2004:	   3-­‐4)	   observed	   the	   chiefly	   temporary	   character	   of	   elite’s	  return	   to	   the	   old	   city	   and	   identified	   dining,	   shopping	   and	   an	  increasing	   search	   for	   heritage	   possible	   reasons.	   This,	   however,	  contrasts	  with	  Smith	  (1979),	  who	  is	  convinced	  that	  gentrification	  is	  ‘a	   back	   to	   the	   city	   movement	   all	   right,	   but	   of	   capital	   rather	   than	  people’	   (547),	   a	   position	   shared	   and	   corroborated	   by	   several	  interviewees	   in	   spring	  2011	   as	  will	   be	   shown	  below.	   In	  Damascus	  signs	  of	  this	  capital-­‐driven	  back-­‐to-­‐the-­‐city-­‐movement	  can	  be	  noted	  in	  both,	  the	  modern	  ‘pericentral	  areas	  of	  the	  agglomeration’	  (Vignal	  2010:	  1),	  namely	  the	  CBD	  and,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  this	  article,	  in	  the	  historic	  old	  city	  intra	  muros.	  	  
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Resilience Since	   Linz’s	   (1964	   [2000])	   systematic	   analysis	   of	   authoritarian	  regimes,	  stagnation	  in	  research	  on	  the	  topic	  was	  noticeable	  until	  the	  late	   1980s.	   However,	   with	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   in	   particular,	  research	  on	  authoritarianism	  experienced	  a	  substantial	  renaissance,	  especially	   in	  connection	  with	  the	  transition	  of	   formerly	  communist	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states	   into	   democracies,	   what	   Huntington	   (1991)	   describes	   as	   the	  ‘Third	  Wave’	  of	  democratization.	  Moreover,	  the	  supposed	  transition	  of	   authoritarian	   regimes	   was	   celebrated	   by	   US	   officials	   and	  numerous	   NGOs	   dedicated	   to	   democracy	   promotion.	   ‘Confronted	  with	   the	   initial	   parts	   of	   the	   third	   wave—democratization	   in	  Southern	  Europe,	  Latin	  America,	  and	  a	  few	  countries	  in	  Asia	  […]	  —the	  U.S.	  democracy	  community	  rapidly	  embraced	  an	  analytic	  model	  of	  democratic	  transition’	  (Carothers	  2002:	  6).	  From	  this	  perspective	  which	   Carothers	   (2002)	   calls	   the	   ‘transition	   paradigm’,	   all	   states	  were	   seen	   as	   situated	   on	   a	   continuum	   somewhere	   between	  authoritarianism	  and	  democracy;	   those	   situated	  around	   the	   centre	  of	   the	   continuum	   were	   further	   considered	   to	   be	   ‘qualified	  democracies’	   undergoing	   the	   transition	   ‘towards	   full	   democracy’	  (Snyder	  2006:	  219).	  However,	  until	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  ‘Arab	  Spring’	  in	  early	   2011,	   authoritarian	   regimes	   across	   the	   globe	   seemed	   to	  recover	   a	   capacity	   of	   resistance	   to	   democratization,	   and	   especially	  so	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (e.g.	  Bellin	  2004).	  Due	  to	  this	  “authoritarian	  resilience”	  Carothers	  (2002:	  6)	  emphasises:	  ‘it	  is	  time	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  transition	  paradigm	  has	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  and	  to	   look	   for	  a	  better	   lens’.	  Following	  this	  appeal,	  Snyder	  (2006)	  argued	  that	  too	  much	  research	  on	  authoritarianism	  was	  devoted	  to	  the	  role	  of	  elections.	  He	  therefore	  urged	  research	  on	  ‘extra-­‐electoral’	  aspects	  of	  authoritarianism.	  	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  authoritarian	  regimes,	   including	   those	   in	   the	  Middle	   East,	   were	   exposured	   to	   external	   pressures	   for	   economic	  liberalization	   and	   political	   reform	   which	   pushed	   them	   to	   develop	  strategies	   to	   cope	  with	   such	   demands	   and,	   build	   up	   new	   forms	   of	  power	   solidification.	   Recently,	   this	   became	   a	   central	   focus	   of	  authoritarianism	   research	   (e.g.	   Pratt	   2007;	   Posusney	   2004;	   King	  2009).	   Additionally,	   forms	   of	   authoritarian	   control,	  which	   from	   an	  authoritarian	  regime’s	  perspective	  could	  be	   termed	  approved5,	  aim	  at	   responding	   ‘aggressively	   to	   the	   triple	   threat	   of	   globalization,	  markets,	   and	   democratization’	   (Heydemann	   2007:	   3).	   One	   such	  response	  is	  co-­‐opting	  new	  clients.	   In	  Syria	  for	  example,	  the	  al-­‐Asad	  regime	   broadens	   its	   power	   base	   by	   embedding	   in	   its	   networks	  businessmen	   instead	   of	  workers	   and	   peasants	  who	   formerly	  were	  crucial	   as	   its	   constituency	   (Hinnebusch	  1995).	   The	   involvement	   of	  domestic	   capitalists	   means	   offering	   them	   new	   business	  opportunities	   and	   creating	   an	   investor-­‐friendly	   environment.	   This	  includes	   –	   as	   Sener	   (2008)	   illustrates	   for	   Turkey	   –	   the	   creation	   of	  urban	   spaces	   for	   a	   transnational	   capitalist	   lifestyle,	   a	   process	   that	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  for	  Old	  Damascus	  in	  the	  following.	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Why not earlier? – (Pre)Conditions of Gentrification in 
Damascus on the Geopolitical, National and Urban Scale This	  section	  will	  address	  the	  forging	  of	  a	  cross-­‐social	  alliance	  under	  Ba’thist	  rule	  and	  how	  the	  actions	  and	  preferences	  of	  both	  the	  regime	  and	   the	   ‘new	   classes’	   translate	   into	   the	   context	   of	   Old	   Damascus.	  Therefore,	   the	   introductory	   historical	   overview	   goes	   back	   to	   the	  time	   of	   colonial	   rule	   when	   the	   course	   for	   later	   changes	   in	   Syria’s	  elite	   structure	   was	   set.	   It	   follows	   the	   investigation	   of	   power	  relations	  and	  gentrification	   from	  a	  historic	  point	  of	  view,	   shedding	  light	  on	  the	  question:	  why	  did	  gentrification	   in	  Old	  Damascus	  start	  around	  the	  millennium?	  After	   World	   War	   I	   Syria	   came	   under	   colonial	   rule	   and	   was	  governed	  as	  a	  French	  Mandate	  between	  1920	  and	  1946.	  Due	  to	  their	  preferred	  recruitment	   first	   into	   the	  French	  colonial	  army	  and	  after	  independence	  into	  the	  Syrian	  army,	  members	  of	  the	  rural	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  minorities	   (Kurds,	   Alawites	   or	   Druzes)	   came	   to	   be	   over-­‐represented	   in	   the	   country’s	   military	   (Van	   Dam	   1978:	   15-­‐18).	  Regional,	   ideological	   and	   sectarian	   conflicts	   resulted	   in	   internal	  instability	   and	   a	   series	   of	  military	   coups	  which	   ended	  1970	   in	   the	  takeover	  of	  Hafiz	  al-­‐Asad	  (e.g.	  Darwisha	  1978:	  341).	  Al-­‐Asad	  and	  his	  regime	  based	  their	  power	  on	  several	  pillars:	  First,	  consolidation	  and	  exertion	   ‘of	   control	   over	   key	   levers	   of	   power’,	   including	   the	   Ba’th	  Party	   as	   a	  means	  of	   ‘popular	   incorporation’	   and	   ‘the	   crafting	  of	   an	  “army-­‐party-­‐symbiosis”’	   (Rabinovich	   1972:	   212);	   second,	   al-­‐Asad	  created	  a	  centralized	  and	  personalized	  presidency;	  third,	  the	  power	  has	   been	  protected	   by	  multiple	   counter-­‐balanced	   security	   services	  and	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  that	  –	  put	  in	  place	  in	  1963	  –	  (Seale	  1988:	  169-­‐184)	  only	  has	  been	  lifted	  in	  2011;	  and,	  finally,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  broad	  social	   foundation	  to	  safeguard	  his	  power.	  The	  latter	  strategy	  included	   a	   populist	   agenda	   aiming	   at	   mobilizing	   additional	  constituencies,	   mostly	   among	   rural	   and	   urban	   populations	  bypassing	   the	   traditional	   urban	   ruling	   class.	   This	   is	   an	   important	  aspect	   of	  what	  Hinnebusch	   describes	   as	   characteristic	   for	   populist	  authoritarian	   regimes.	   Those	   are,	   ‘first	   of	   all,	   vehicles	   of	   a	   ‘new	  middle	   class’	   radicalised	  by	   the	  perceived	   incompatibility	   between	  the	  oligarchic	  order	  and	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  its	  demands	  for	  modern	  careers	  and	  a	  share	  of	  power’	  (Hinnebusch	  2001:	  3).	  	  From	   the	   Ba’th	   revolution	   onwards	   enhanced	   upward	   social	  mobility	   resulted	   in	   accelerated	   rural-­‐urban	   migration:	   Syria’s	  political	   capital	  Damascus	   as	  well	   as	   the	   country’s	   second	   city	   and	  economic	   centre	   Aleppo	   were	   the	   preferred	   destinations.	   These	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rural	  newcomers	  acquired	  access	  to	  political	  power	  and	  wealth	  and	  subsequently	   underwent	   a	   process	   of	   embourgeoisement,	  meanwhile	  displacing	  the	  old	  elites.	  The	  political	  marginalization	  of	  the	   old	   ruling	   class	   involved,	   first,	   changes	   in	   Damascus’	  demographic	  composition	  which	  ‘aimed	  at	  making	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  party	   to	   entrench	   itself	   in	   Syria’s	   hostile	   urban	   environments’	  (Hinnebusch	   2001:	   53	   referring	   to	   Delvin	   1983:	   23,	   121),	   and,	  second,	  translated	  into	  a	  changing	  urban	  landscape.	  During	   the	   late	   Ottoman	   period,	   members	   of	   the	   Damascene	  elites	   had	   started	   to	   consider	   living	   outside	   the	   old	   town	   as	   an	  expression	  of	  a	  modern	  lifestyle:	  based	  on	  new	  preferences	  families	  who	   could	   afford	   it	   left	   the	   old	   city	   and	   moved	   to	   comfortable	  houses	   in	  one	  of	   the	  modern,	  western	  style	  neighbourhoods.	  Many	  leased	  their	  abandoned	  houses	  to	  rural	  migrants,	  who	  on	  their	  part	  considered	  the	  old	  city	  as	  an	  interstation.	  This	  represents	  a	  time	  of	  suburbanization	  and	  the	  successive	  transformation	  of	  Old	  Damascus	  into	  a	  heavily	  populated,	  disinvested	  lower-­‐class	  area.	  This	  creeping	  process	  continued	  during	  the	  French	  Mandate	  and	  even	  accelerated	  after	   Syria’s	   independence	   (Pfaffenbach	   2004;	   Salamandra	   2004).	  Housing	   became	   more	   than	   simply	   a	   home;	   it	   now	   served	   as	   an	  expression	   of	   lifestyle,	   and	   when	   the	   new	   Ba’th-­‐generated	  bourgeoisie	   later	   ascended	   to	   power,	   ‘[t]hey	   tried	   to	   emulate	   the	  lifestyles	   of	   the	   old	   bourgeoisie,	   but	  more	   ostentatiously’	   (Perthes	  1991:	   34).	   For	   most	   fractions	   of	   the	   bourgeoisie,	   living	   in	  prestigious	   modern	   neighbourhoods	   such	   as	   Malki	   or	   Abu	  Roumaneh	   was	   the	   epitome	   of	   a	   modern	   Syria.	   The	   old	   town	   by	  contrast	  became	  endangered	  by	  decay	  and	  a	  widespread	  extension	  of	  modern	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  streets	  and	  motorways.	  Despite	  a	  returning	   awareness	   for	   the	   old	   city’s	   cultural	   heritage	   among	  intellectuals	  (Escher	  2001)	  and	  officials,	  the	  decay	  of	  Old	  Damascus	  continued	   until	   the	   1990s	   as	   did	   the	   migration	   towards	   modern	  neighborhoods.	  	  During	   the	   1970s,	   Syria’s	   economy	   went	   through	   a	   period	   of	  boom	   and	   saw	   the	   influx	   of	   foreign	   aid	   and	   remittances	   of	   Syrian	  nationals	  living	  abroad	  (Winckler	  1999).	  The	  conditions	  of	  potential	  gentrification	   came	   about,	   first,	   by	   the	   existence	   of	   potential	  investment	   capital,	   second,	   the	   availability	   of	   centrally	   located	  (disinvested)	   historic	   housing	   stocks,	   and,	   third,	   a	   growing	  awareness	   of	   the	   architectural	   heritage	   in	   terms	   of	   both	   economic	  and	   ideational	   value.	   However,	   the	   process	   did	   not	   gather	  momentum	   at	   that	   time.	   Asked	   for	   a	   possible	   explanation	   for	   the	  absence	   of	   gentrification	   during	   the	   1970s	   a	   Damascene	   political	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analyst	  mentioned	  that	  on	  the	  urban	  scale	  the	  Baath	  regime’s	  power	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  entirely	  consolidated:	  	  At	  a	  certain	  time	  gentrification	  was	  not	  allowed	  because	  it	  would	  have	   meant	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   urban	   Sunnis	   and…	   a	   kind	   of	   a,	   you	  know,	   political	   opposition	   of	   the	   business	   society	   against	   the	  regime.6	  Throughout	  the	  1970s	  opposition	  to	  the	  regime	  was	  strong	  and	  gave	  rise	  to	  sporadic	  upheavals.	  Many	  Syrians	  considered	  the	  regime	  ‘as	  a	  revanchist	   minority	   conspiracy	   […]	   against	   the	   majority	   Sunnis’	  (Drysdale	   1982:	   3).	   Opposition	   from	   traditional	   fractions	   of	   the	  urban	   population	   who	   were	   deprived	   from	   their	   political	   and	  economic	  power	  –	  i.e.	  the	  suq	  and	  the	  old	  elites	  –	  was	  manifold	  and	  escalated	  between	  1979	  and	  1982	  into	  what	  later	  became	  known	  as	  the	   Muslim	   Brethren	   Revolt	   peaking	   in	   the	   massacre	   of	   Hama.	   A	  business	  consultant	  reported	  that	  whilst	   the	  situation	   in	  Damascus	  remained	   comparatively	   calm,	   the	   revolt’s	   consequences	   were	  perceivable	  in	  the	  capital,	  too:	  Speaking	  about	  Damascus	  during	  the	  70s,	  actually,	  and	  then	  in	  the	  80s,	   Damascus	   turned	   to	   be	   a	   closed	   city	   during	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood…	  trouble.	  […]	  the	  people	  used	  to	  stay	  at	  home,	  not	  to	  go	  out.	  It	  was	  a	  difficult	  time.	  In	  this	  time	  a	  lot	  of	  cafes	  closed.	  […]	  During	  the	  1980s	  also	  we	  suffered	  from	  economic	  crises	  for	  about	  10	  years.7	  The	   reasons	   for	   the	   economic	   crisis	   during	   the	   1980s	   were	  manifold:	   Despite	   massive	   public	   investment,	   production	   did	   not	  expand	   accordingly:	   ‘statist	   development	   failed	   to	   create	   a	   self-­‐sustaining	   industrial	   base’	   (Hinnebusch	   2001:	   129).	   Furthermore,	  Syria’s	   ‘overdependence	   on	   external	   resources’	   (ibid.)	   resulted	   in	  foreign	  debts	  and	  inflation.	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  end	   of	   the	   bi-­‐polar	   world	   order	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   posed	   another	  challenge	   for	   the	   Ba’th	   regime.	   The	   country	   did	   not	   only	   lose	   its	  long-­‐standing	   patron	   in	   the	   confrontation	   with	   Israel	   but	   also	   its	  major	  donor.	  The	  regime	  realized	  the	  necessity	  of	  an	  economic	  and	  ideological	   realignment,	   which	   was	   initiated,	   first,	   by	   hesitantly	  approaching	   the	   West	   on	   the	   international	   stage	   and,	   second,	   by	  controlled	  economic	  liberalization,	  the	  latter	  being	  crowned	  by	  Law	  10	  of	  1991	  (Seifan	  2010:	  5f).	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At	  that	  time	  also,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  society	  started	  to	  change:	  […]	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Syrian	  society	  during	  the	  70s	  was	  middle	  class.	  During	   the	   80s	   and	   then	   through	   the	   90s	   started	   the	  diversification	   of	   the	   society.	   This	   means	   during	   the	   economic	  crisis	  big	  parts	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  went	  down	  to	  be	  poor	  and	  some	  small	  elites	  jumped	  to	  be	  rich.8	  Apart	   from	  growing	   social	   cleavages	  which	   found	   their	   expression	  in	   the	   ascent	   of	   a	   new	   oligarchy	   consisting	   of	   regime	   cronies	   and	  their	  offspring	  (Ismail	  2009:	  18),	  another	  societal	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  noticed:	  the	  production	  and	  consumption	  of	  a	   ‘return	  to	  the	  old’	  (awda	   lil-­qadim)	   going	   along	   with	   an	   increasing	   awareness	   of	  cultural	   heritage	   which	   started	   hesitantly	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   has	  gained	   momentum	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   (Salamandra	   2004).	   In	  1977,	   five	   years	   after	   the	   UN	   adopted	   the	   UNESCO-­‐drafted	  World	  Heritage	  Convention	   this	   found	   its	   expression	   in	   the	   foundation	  of	  an	   NGO	   called	   The	   Association	   of	   Friends	   of	   Damascus,	   which	   is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  protection	  and	  ‘beautification’	  of	  Damascus	  and	  its	  historical	   heritage	   through	   cooperation	   with	   governmental	  authorities.9	   In	   1979	   the	   Ancient	   City	   of	   Damascus,	   meaning	  primarily	   the	   old	   city	   intra	  muros,	   was	   listed	   as	   a	  World	   Heritage	  site	  (Wirth	  2000).	  ‘By	  signing	  the	  Convention,	  each	  country	  pledges	  to	   conserve	   not	   only	   the	   World	   Heritage	   sites	   situated	   on	   its	  territory,	  but	  also	  to	  protect	  its	  national	  heritage’.10	  However,	  as	  it	  is	  ‘[t]raditionally	   controlled	   by	   the	   well-­‐born	   and	   well-­‐off,	   heritage	  remains	  more	  an	  elite	  than	  a	  folk	  domain’	  (Lowenthal	  1998:	  14)	  and	  this	  can	  be	  observed	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  Old	  Damascus’	  urban	   fabric	  and	   issues	   of	   architectural	   design,	   too.	   Jager	   1986	   points	   out	   the	  built	   environment’s	   centrality	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   process	   of	   class	  formation,	   and	   thus	   gentrification,	   ‘as	   both	   a	   container	   and	  expression	   of	   social	   relations’	   (153).	   How	   Jager’s	   conclusion	   gains	  momentum	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  expanding	  leisure	  sector	  in	  the	  old	  city	  is	  described	  by	  a	  business	  consultant	  during	  an	   interview	  as	   follows:	  
When	   you	   have	   elite,	   rich	   people,	   actually	   they	   have	   demand	   for	  
entertaining.	  So,	  here	  the	  demand	  comes	  for	  cafes,	  for	  restaurants.11	  A	  European	   city	   planner	   charged	   with	   giving	   advice	   to	   the	   local	  administration	   regarding	   urban	   renewal	   speculated	   that	   Western	  tourists	  and	  their	  tastes,	  preferences	  and	  aesthetic	  sensations	  might	  have	  had	  their	  share	  in	  the	  set	  of	  causes	  for	  the	  increased	  interest	  by	  Damascenes	  in	  their	  (old)	  city:	  	  It	  might	  have	  been	  increasing	  international	  tourism,	  backpackers,	  younger	   people.	   And	   it	  was	   perceived	   as	   being	   attractive.	   If	   it	   is	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attracting	   young	   Europeans	   then	   we	   should	   find	   it	   attractive	   as	  well,	  talking	  about	  young	  Damascenes,	  particularly	  wealthier	  ones.	  But	  I	  don't	  know.12	  An	   investor	   who	   opened	   one	   of	   the	   first	   boutique	   hotels	   in	  Damascus	   argues	   that	   the	   transfer	   of	   power	   to	   Bashar	   al-­‐Asad	   in	  2000	   had	   a	   direct	   impact	   on	   the	   trend	   to	   renovate	   and	  commercialize	  houses	  since	  the	  millennium:	  	  Before	  2000	  the	  country	  was	  completely	  closed.	  In	  2000	  president	  Bashar	   al-­‐Asad	   took	   over.	   A	   young	   president,	   young	  wife,	   young	  blood	   and	   he	   started	   to	   open	   up	   the	   country,	   slowly,	   slowly	   to…	  For	  tourism	  and	  this	  is	  how	  it	  started.13	  The	   revival	   of	   the	  hamam,	   the	   traditional	   Turkish	   bath,	   is	   another	  manifestation	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  tourism,	  external	  influences	  and	   an	   increasing	   awareness	   for	   the	   own	   cultural	   heritage.	   An	  architect	  working	  in	  the	  local	  administration	  gave	  a	  vivid	  account	  of	  how	   interaction	   with	   an	   external	   other	   can	   directly	   influence	   the	  perception	  of	  one’s	  own	  heritage,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  traditional	  hamam:	  I	  never	   tried	   to	  go	   to	  a	  hamam.	   It	  was	   something	  out	  of	   thought.	  Nobody	  would	  think	  of	  this	  even	  as	  we	  saw	  it	  on	  TV	  and	  we	  used	  to	   consider	   it	   as	   something	   back	   in	   history	   which	   did	   not	   exist.	  Maybe	  we	   didn’t	   dare	   to	   see	   how	   it	   really	   is	   or	   to	   try	   it	   and	   see	  how	  it	   is	  nowadays.[…]	  The	   first	   time	  I	  had	  to	  go	   there	  because	   I	  was	  asked	  to	  do	  it	  by	  a	  friend	  visiting	  from	  Europe.	  And	  for	  me	  it	  was	  a	  big	  sacrifice	  I	  was	  doing	  because	  nobody	  did	  go	  to	  a	  hamam.	  But	  after	  the	  first	  time	  I	  did	  really	  like	  it.	  It	  is	  something	  nice	  and	  it	  began	   to	   become	   a	   habit.	   But	   still	   it	   is	   an	   experience,	   you	   are	  treated	  like	  a	  sultan	  [laughter]	  well,	  we	  need	  this	  sometimes!14	  However,	  the	  growing	  interest	  in	  Damascene	  heritage	  has	  by	  far	  not	  been	   limited	   to	   restoring	   architectural	   artefacts	   like	   hamams,	  restaurants	   and	   hotels.	   Moreover	   it	   involves	   many	   real	   and	  imagined	  aspects	  of	  traditional	  everyday	  life	  and	  finds	  its	  expression	  inter	   alia	   in	   popular	   TV	   series	   (musalsalat)	   like	   Ayyam	   Shamiyya	  (Damascene	  Days)	  and	  Bab	  al-­‐Hara	  (The	  Gate	  of	  the	  Neigbourhood)	  which	   are	   set	   in	   late-­‐Ottoman	   Damascus	   (see	   Salamandra	   1998;	  2004).	  Regarding	  Bab	  al-­‐Hara	  an	   investor	   involved	   in	  several	  hotel	  projects	  intra	  and	  extra	  muros	  reports	  the	  following:	  	  Je	   me	   rappelle	   à	   des	   Jordaniens	   qui	   sont	   venus	   et	   ils	   m’ont	  demandés:	   “où	   est	   Bab	   al	   Hara?”	   Jusque	   le	   nom…ça	   fait	   rêver!	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[…]Ces	   films	   ont	   poussé	   les	   gens	   vers	   la	   nostalgie	   et	   ont	   fait	  aiguiser	  le	  sentiment	  d’aller	  à	  Damas,	  de	  voir,	  etc.15	  Nostalgia	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  national	  identity	  orchestrated	  by	  the	  regime	   in	   cooperation	   with	   the	   private	   film	   industry	   and	   thus	   a	  commodity	  ready	  for	  consumption	  not	  alone	  in	  Syria	  but	  throughout	  the	   Arab	   world.	   These	   TV	   series	   not	   only	   show	   late	   Ottoman	   life:	  They	   rather	   produce	   an	   uncritical	   enshrinement	   of	   the	   traditions,	  the	   costumes	   and	   the	   architecture	   of	   that	   specific	   historic	   era.	  Professionals	   involved	   in	   renovation	   projects	   within	   the	   old	   city	  already	   warn	   of	   the	   dangers	   for	   the	   urban	   fabric	   due	   to	   an	  imaginary	  past	  which	  –	  at	  least	  for	  some	  –	  became	  the	  blueprint	  for	  renovation.16	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  start	  of	  gentrification	  in	  Damascus	  had	  been	  restrained	   until	   the	   1990s.	   This	   can	   be	   retraced	   to	   manifold	  political,	   economic	   and	   social	   reasons	   such	   as,	   first,	   the	   regime’s	  priority	   to	   consolidate	   its	   power	   domestically	   (i.e.	   by	   suppressing	  any	  form	  of	  opposition	  and	  the	  creating	  of	  jobs	  in	  an	  inflated	  public	  sector),	   second,	   a	   severe	   economic	   crises	   during	   the	   1980s,	   third,	  suburbanization	  and,	   finally,	  a	  widespread	  hostile	  attitude	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	   city’s	   neglected	   urban	   heritage.	   As	   the	   author	   could	   observe	  during	  several	  stays	  in	  Damascus,	  it	  was	  not	  before	  2001/	  2002	  that	  the	   old	   town	   became	   a	   popular	   evening	   destination	   and	   thus	   a	  hotspot	   of	   gentrification.	   Possible	   triggers	   for	   the	   late	   start	   of	  gentrification	  in	  Old	  Damascus	  are	  diverse	  and	  include	  inter	  alia:	  	  -­‐	   the	   political	   will	   to	   facilitate	   private	   investment	   and,	   as	  component	   of	   economic	   opening	   (infitah)	   since	   the	   1990s,	  legislative	   changes	   in	   the	   field	   of	   real	   estate	   (e.g.	   the	  possibility	   to	  commercialize	  historic	  residential	  property);	  -­‐	   the	   expansion	   of	   international	   tourism	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	  globalization	   which	   is	   said	   to	   have	   played	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	  stimulating	   gentrification;	   this	   is	   especially	   the	   case	   in	   the	  historic	  centre	  of	  the	  Syrian	  capital;	  -­‐	   the	   success	   of	   ‘pioneers’,	   individuals	   who	   went	   ahead	   with	  innovative	  ideas	  such	  as	  the	  transformation	  of	  traditional	  courtyard	  houses	   into	   boutique	   restaurants,	   boutique	   hotels	   or	   art	   galleries	  which	  is	  not	  to	  be	  underestimated,	  and	  finally	  -­‐	   the	   traditional	   rivalry	   between	   Damascus	   and	   Aleppo	   which	  possibly	   did	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   timing	   of	   gentrification	   as	   the	  owner	   of	   a	   guesthouse	   and	   former	   inhabitant	   of	   Old	   Damascus	  states	  regarding	  the	  opening	  of	  boutique	  hotels:	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It	   started	   first	   in	   Aleppo,	   not	   in	   Damascus,	   the	   idea	   of	   having	  boutique	  hotels	   in	  the	  old	  city.	  Now,	  the	  decision-­‐makers	  […],	  the	  local	  government,	  is	  responsible	  for	  one	  particular	  city.	  Usually	  the	  decisions	   are	   in	   their	   hands.	   So	   the	   local	   government	   of	   Aleppo	  started	  very	  fast,	  Damascus	  has	  always	  rejected	  that	  idea	  but	  later	  on,	  I	  was	  somehow	  surprised	  that	  they	  agreed.17	  
Producing Gentrification As	  explained	  above	  gentrifiers	  and	  their	  consumption	  patterns	  seem	  to	   take	   the	   centre	   stage	   in	   much	   newer	   studies	   on	   gentrification.	  This	  often	  criticised	  approach	  does	  not	  only	  ignore	  the	  concerns	  of	  a	  neighbourhood’s	   original	   population	   but	   also	   obscures	   aspects	   of	  the	   production	   of	   gentrification,	   i.e.	   actors’	   intentions.	   Whereas	  globalization	   makes	   regional	   particularities	   of	   middle	   or	   upper	  class’	  lifestyles	  fade	  away,	  the	  local	  contexts	  in	  which	  gentrification	  is	   produced	   differ	   substantially.	   As	   was	   illustrated	   above,	   Syria’s	  domestic	  politics	  caused	  a	  delay	  relative	  to	  the	  start	  of	  gentrification	  elsewhere	  but	  was	  later	  facilitated	  by	  its	  incorporation	  into	  regional	  and	   international	  networks	  under	  Bashar	   al-­‐Asad.	  By	   investigating	  producers	   of	   gentrification’s	   actions,	   their	   motivations	   and	  perceptions	   this	   section	   sheds	   light	   on	   the	   particularities	   of	  gentrification	   in	   Damascus	   as	   well	   as	   links	   between	   gentrification	  and	  authoritarian	  resilience.	  	  Gentrification	   unfolds	   on	   different	   geographic	   scales,	   with	   the	  neighbourhood	  scale	  and	  individual	  buildings	  being	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper.	  Regarding	  Old	  Damascus	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  decisions	  of	  “official	  producers	   of	   gentrification”,	   meaning	   civil	   servants,	   employees	   of	  international	   organizations	   and	   consultants	   dealing	   with	   urban	  change,	   are	   most	   decisive.	   By	   contrast,	   “private	   producers	   of	  gentrification”	   such	   as	   investors,	   architects	   and	   craftsmen	   star	   on	  the	   scale	   of	   individual	   houses.	   The	   social	   background	   of	   the	  investors	   is	   very	   diverse:	   some	   of	   them	   inherited	   their	   family’s	  home	  and	  now	   look	   for	  a	  new	  use.	  Many	  belong	   to	   the	  Damascene	  bourgeoisie	  whereas	  others,	  often	  bureaucrats	  and	  regime	  cronies,	  have	   no	   direct	   personal	   link	   to	   Old	   Damascus	   at	   all.	   Also,	   huge	  enterprises	  both	   from	  Syria	   as	  well	   as	   from	  abroad	  now	   try	   to	  get	  possession	  of	  historic	  buildings.	  As	  property	  prices	  in	  Old	  Damascus	  exploded,	  investing	  in	  boutique	  hotels	  became	  a	  fashion.18	  	  Until	   the	   1990s	   there	   were	   no	   restaurants	   within	   the	   old	   city	  apart	   from	   ‘small	   restaurants	   which	   just	   sold	   hommus	   and	   foul	   […]	  
with	  just	  two	  or	  three	  tables’19.	  Two	  or	  three	  restaurants,	  which	  had	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opened	  in	  former	  commercial	  buildings	  situated	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Christian	  quarter	  Bab	  Tuma,	  were	  the	  exception.	  This	  happened	  at	  a	  time	  when	  members	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  middle	  class	  started	  to	  give	  up	  their	  hostile	  attitude	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  old	  city	  which	  they	  up	  to	  then	   had	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   embodiment	   of	   the	   country’s	  backwardness	   (Salamandra	   2004).	   The	   trend	   of	   renovating	  traditional	   Damascene	   courtyard	   houses	   and	   their	   transformation	  into	   cafés	   and	   restaurants	   followed	   the	   initial	   and	   pioneering	  renovation	   of	   Beit	   Jabri	   and	   its	   transformation	   into	   the	   first	  boutique	  restaurant,	  which	  opened	  in	  1999:	  	  The	  house	  was	  inherited	  by	  the	  actual	  owner	  of	  the	  restaurant.	  […]	  Of	  course,	   finding	  yourself	   in	   front	  of	  a	   treasure	   like	   this	  and	  not	  having	   enough	   means	   to	   do	   whatever	   –	   it	   was	   a	   way	   to	   find	   a	  financing.20	  
Beit	  Jabri	  Café	  and	  Restaurant	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  successful	  business	  model	   which	   was	   copied	   myriad	   times.	   For	   2005	   an	   architect	   at	  Maktab	   al-­‐Anbar	   puts	   the	   number	   of	   boutique	   restaurants	   within	  the	  walled	  old	   town	  at	   65,	   three	   years	   later	   their	   number	   reached	  99.	   According	   to	   the	   same	   interviewee	   demand	   for	   boutique	  restaurants	   is	   the	  expression	  of	  an	   increasing	  awareness	  regarding	  cultural	  heritage	  and	  the	  national	  past	  (see	  below)	  going	  along	  with	  a	   substantial	   change	   of	   leisure	   practices	   of	   the	   middle	   and	   upper	  classes:	  ‘So,	  gradually,	  the	  old	  city	  has	  suddenly	  changed	  into	  a	  commercial	  venue,	  for	  touristic	  reasons	  obviously.	  And	  people,	  whether	  we	  are	  talking	   about	   Syrians	   or	   non-­‐Syrians,	   Europeans	   or	   other	   non-­‐Syrians,	  were	   interested	   in	  having	  exotic	  dinners	   in	  an	  old	  house	  which	  has	  history,	  a	  background	  and	  a	   fountain	   in	   the	  middle.	  So	  people	  who	   live	   in	   the	  modern	  part	  of	  Damascus,	   let's	  say,	   in	   the	  evening	   they	   were	   interested	   to	   come	   to	   an	   exciting	   place	   for	  dinner	  or	  to	  smoke	  an	  arghile...’21	  Syria’s	  economic	  recovery	  and	  the	  government’s	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	   business	   friendly	   investment	   climate	   contributed	   to	   the	  acceleration	  of	  gentrification	   in	  Old	  Damascus,	   too.	  However,	   these	  developments	  have	  a	  severe	  impact	  on	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  conditions	  of	  life	  in	  the	  old	  city:	  [Especially	  restaurants]	  place	  a	  demand	   in	   terms	  of	   […]	   levels,	   in	  terms	   of	   infrastructure.	   Washing	   up	   after	   100	   meals	   takes	   a	   lot	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more	   in	   terms	   of	   resources	   then	   it	   does	   to	   wash	   up	   after	   eight	  meals	  as	   it	  had	  been	  when	  a	  family	  was	  living	  there.	  So	  there	  are	  pressures	  on	  resources,	  on	  infrastructure.	  There	  are	  also	  issues	  to	  do	   with	   good	   neighbourliness	   because	   a	   restaurant	   is	   a	   much	  poorer	   neighbour	   for	   most	   people	   than	   an	   ordinary	   house.	   So	  there	  are	  ways	  in	  which	  you	  have	  to	  manipulate	  change	  to	  ensure	  that	  you	  get	  the	  right	  benefits.22	  Traffic	  caused	  by	  guests	  and	  social	  behaviour	  not	  meeting	  residents’	  traditional	   values	   are	   further	   sources	   of	   conflict.	   In	   2007	   the	   local	  authorities	   implemented	   an	   integrated	  masterplan	   for	   the	   old	   city	  aiming	  at	  an	  acceptable	  solution	  for	  residents	  and	  businesses	  alike.	  The	  masterplan	   sets	   out	   a	   number	   of	   different	   zones	   and	   allots	   to	  them	   specific	   functions.	   Its	   main	   achievement	   is	   formally	   banning	  the	   construction	   of	   new	   restaurants	   in	   residential	   areas	   and	   all	  locations	   except	   the	   main	   touristic	   axes.	   Beside	   the	   Strait	   Street	  these	   axes	   include	  Qaymariya	   Street,	  which	   runs	  between	  Noufara	  Café	  and	  Bab	  Tuma	  and	  until	  recently	  was	  a	  minor	  commercial	  and	  residential	   street.	   An	   architect	   who	   was	   involved	   in	   drafting	   the	  master	  plan	  for	  the	  old	  city	  explains	  this	  as	  follows:	  Even	   before	   that	   masterplan	   many	   of	   the	   houses	   were	   already	  bought	  and	  transferred	  into	  other	  activities	  because	  of	  the	  location	  close	   to	   Bab	   Tuma.	   […]	   And	   being	   a	   very	   residential	   area	   it	  was	  cheaper	  to	  buy	  houses	  there	  as	  [they]	  are	  not	  on	  the	  main	  axis.	  At	  the	  end	  we	  had	  to	  face	  the	  reality:	  It	  is	  already	  an	  axis.23	  When	  the	  local	  administration	  tightened	  the	  licensing	  conditions	  for	  further	  restaurants,	  investors	  started	  searching	  for	  new	  investment	  opportunities	  and	  as	  a	  result	  boutique	  hotels	  sprang	  up	  throughout	  Old	   Damascus.	   Beit	   Mamlouka,	   the	   first	   boutique	   hotel	   in	   Old	  Damascus	   opened	   in	   spring	   2005.	   The	   former	   owner,	   who	  renovated	  the	  place	  into	  the	  prototype	  of	  this	  new	  kind	  of	  business,	  recalls:	  	  By	   2005	   when	   I	   finished	   the	   Mamlouka,	   and	   I	   still	   remember	  people	  saying:	  oh,	  nobody	  will	  come	  and	  stay	  in	  those	  houses,	  no,	  no	   foreigner	   will	   come	   to	   those	   houses.	   So	   of	   course	   when	   I	  opened	   I	   was	   maybe	   slightly	   ahead	   of	   the	   people	   […]	   You	   see,	  whenever	   somebody	   says	   in	  Beit	  Mamlouka	   they	  did	   like	   that	   or	  Beit	  Mamlouka	  has	  done	  like	  this,	   it	   is	  really	  a	  trend	  I	  […].	  This	  is	  why	   if	   you	   go	   from	   hotel	   to	   hotel	   (you	   can	   see)	   that	   they	   all	  followed	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   rooms	   are	   decorated	   differently,	   they	  followed	  to	  give	  every	  room	  a	  specific	  name…24	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Straight	   after	   its	   launch	   the	   international	   travel	   press	   celebrated	  Beit	   Mamlouka	   as	   the	   new	   insider	   destination	   for	   authentic	  upmarket	   city	   breaks.	   This	   attracted	   the	   attention	   of	   potential	  investors	   and	   the	   prospect	   of	   high	   profits	   accelerated	   the	   demand	  for	  houses	  suitable	  for	  being	  transformed	  into	  boutique	  hotels.	  Since	  heritage	   in	   Damascus,	   as	   elsewhere,	   ‘customarily	   bends	   to	  market	  forces’	  (Lowenthal	  1996:	  97),	  investors,	  as	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  boutique	  hotel	   confesses,	   literally	   reuse	   historic	   buildings	   to	   squeeze	   profit	  from	  heritage:	  Tourists	  pay	  for	  authenticity	  and	  therefore	  we	  make	  it	  
as	  authentic	  as	  possible.	  And	  there	  needn’t	  many	  changes	  to	  be	  done	  –	  
these	  houses	  are	  already	  marvellous.25	  	  Asked	  about	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  investors	  a	  consultant	  involved	  in	  one	  of	  the	  old	  city’s	  biggest	  restoration	  projects	  states:	  	  They	  just	  discovered	  that	  it	  is	  good	  business	  and	  then	  they	  came	  to	  the	  old	  city.	  O.K.	  some	  are	  from	  the	  old	  city.	  They	  have	  big	  houses.	  They	   turned	   the	   house	   to	   either	   a	   restaurant	   or	   boutique	   hotel.	  Some	   of	   them	   discovered	   it’s	   profitable	   so	   tried	   to	   purchase	   a	  house	   to	  start	   that	  business.	  Some	  of	   them	  are	  not	   from	  the	  area	  and	  not	  the	  old	  city	  at	  all,	  they	  are	  just	  rich	  people	  actually.26	  According	   to	   an	   architect	   employed	   at	  Maktab	   al-­‐Anbar	   all	   houses	  with	  a	  courtyard	  of	  at	  least	  25	  square	  meters	  and	  a	  minimum	  of	  nine	  rooms	  qualify	  for	  transformation	  into	  a	  boutique	  hotel.27	  Owners	  of	  smaller	  houses	  can	  apply	  for	  being	  licensed	  as	  a	  motel	  (guesthouse).	  There	   is	  no	  policy	   restricting	  boutique	  hotels	   to	   specific	   areas,	   e.g.	  locations	  outside	   residential	   quarters.	  However,	   as	   soon	  as	   a	  hotel	  offers	   hot	   meals	   the	   zoning	   rules	   for	   restaurants	   apply.	   The	  
masterplan	   doesn't	   give	   any	   limits	   to	   the	   hotels	   yet,	   only	   for	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Picture 2.1: Pre-gentrification – Everyday life in the courtyard of a  
Damascene house in the old city. 
	  
Picture 2.2: Post-gentrification – The same house after its 
‘revitalization’ and transformation into a boutique hotel. 
 
Source: Both photographs by Yannick Sudermann, 2001; 2011. 
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Another	   common	   though	   illegal	   practice	   was	   merging	   smaller	  buildings	   in	   order	   to	   qualify	   as	   boutique	   hotel.	   This	   status	  means	  more	  stars,	  more	  services,	  and	  more	  pressure	  on	  the	  old	  city.	  Again,	  as	  with	  the	  unpredictable	  spread	  of	  restaurants,	  which	  one	  architect	  compared	   to	   cancer	   cells,	   the	   local	   administration	   was	   taken	   by	  surprise	   regarding	   the	   success	   of	   boutique	   hotels.	   Instead	   of	  implementing	   policies	   that	   guide	   the	   opening	   of	   boutique	   hotels	  from	  the	  beginning,	  the	  authorities	  only	  have	  been	  reacting	  on	  facts	  dictated	  by	  the	  market.30	  	  The	  spread	  of	  boutique	  hotels	  all	  over	  Old	  Damascus	  involves	  a	  further	  massive	  rise	  in	  property	  prices.31	  This	  has	  already	  started	  to	  induce	   a	   shortage	   of	   affordable	   housing	   and	   the	   change	   from	   a	  traditional	   residential	   area	   into	   a	   tourist	   destination	   (see	   pictures	  2.1	  and	  2.2).	  Both	  put	  what	  Peter	  Marcuse	  (1986)	  terms	  “pressures	  of	  displacement”32	  on	  the	  remaining	  residents.	  These	   changes	   resulted	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   gradually	   people	   started	  either	  to	  be	  tempted	  to	  sell	   their	  properties	  or	  to	  be	  bothered	  by	  the	  commercial	  places	  and	  its	  disadvantages.	  Then	  they	  wanted	  to	  get	   rid	   of	   living	   in	   the	   old	   city	   as	   soon	   as	   possible.	   And	   I	   know	  cases.	  I	  know	  a	  lot	  of	  cases	  of	  people	  who	  didn't	  like	  the	  changes;	  and	  that's	  why	  they	  sold	  their	  houses,	  not	  only	  from	  temptation	  of	  money.33	  Since	   investing	   in	   boutique	   hotels	   became	   a	   fashion,	   trendsetters	  such	   as	   the	   former	   owner	   of	   Beit	   Mamlouka	   are	   already	   on	   the	  lookout	   for	   new	   investment	   opportunities	   within	   Old	   Damascus.	  ‘Boutique	  offices’	   upmarket	  housing	   and	   luxury	  holiday	  homes	  are	  starting	  to	  become	  options	  for	  people	  intending	  to	  invest	  in	  historic	  property.	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   local	   administration	   is	   aware	   of	   this	  problem	   and	   its	   negative	   impact	   on	   affected	   neighbourhoods.	   An	  architect	  working	  at	  for	  the	  local	  administration	  expresses	  the	  view	  that:	  This	   is	   also	   dangerous,	   this	   is	   very	   risky	   because	   it	   affects	   the	  prices	  of	   the	  houses	  and	  changes	   the	   image	  of	   the	  city.	  We	  know	  about	   other	   cities	   with	   many	   homeowners	   not	   living	  (permanently)	   in	  that	  city	  only	  visiting	  once	  or	  twice	  a	  year	  for	  a	  little	   vacation	   [..]	   And	   it	   pushes	   up	   the	   prices	   to	   a	   level	   where	  locals	  would	   no	  more	   be	   able	   to	   afford	   to	   buy	   and	   invest.	   And	   I	  wouldn’t	   like	   the	   city	   to	   be	   […]	   owned	   by	   non-­‐locals	   or	   non-­‐Syrians.	  It	  would	  be	  [a]	  fake	  place	  at	  the	  end…34	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The Bourgeoisie, Gentrification and Authoritarian Resilience ‘Weber	   argues	   that,	   as	   ideology	   inevitably	   declines,	   new	   regimes	  must	  consolidate	  power	  through	  provision	  of	  routine	  and	  economic	  benefits	   and	   opportunities,	   in	   the	   first	   place	   to	   core	   followers,	   but	  also	   to	  broader	   constituencies’	   (Hinnebusch	  2009:	  7).	  This	   is	  what	  happened	   in	   Syria	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Baath	   revolution.	   The	  regime	   encouraged	   the	   embourgeoisement	   of	   fractions	   of	   its	  formerly	   revolutionary	   constituency	   by	   redistribution	   and	   thus	  allowed	   for	   the	   rise	   of	   a	   new	   class,	   the	   state	   bourgeoisie,	   which	  increasingly	   ‘became	   receptive	   to	   the	   use	   of	   wealth	   by	   privileged	  groups	   to	   buy	   political	   influence	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   plebeian	  constituency’	   (Hinnebusch	   2009:	   9).	  During	   the	   economic	   crisis	   of	  the	   1980s,	   the	   regime	   found	   itself	   incapable	   of	   dealing	   with	   the	  challenges	   and	   made	   attempts	   to	   broaden	   its	   power	   base	   by	   co-­‐opting	   parts	   of	   the	   old	   bourgeoisie.35	   This	   had,	   for	   example,	   been	  happening	   in	   the	   form	   of	   state	   contracts,	   which	   brought	   regime	  cronies	   into	   the	   position	   of	   representatives	   of	   international	  enterprises	  or	  middle-­‐men,	  or	  by	  granting	  privileged	  access	  to	  new	  business	   sectors	   e.g.	   the	   fast-­‐growing	   tourism	   industry	   and	   real	  estate.	   Both	   practices	   had	   a	   direct	   impact	   on	   gentrification	   in	   Old	  Damascus.	  For	   instance,	   opening	   hotels	   and	   restaurants	   before	   obtaining	  the	   necessary	   licenses	   has	   become	   a	  widespread	   strategy	   and	   has	  enabled	   owners	   of	   gentrified	   property	   to	   raise	   profits	   as	   soon	   as	  possible.	  Thus,	  they	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  establish	  their	  businesses	  on	  the	   market	   and	   to	   build	   up	   a	   client	   base	   –	   often	   among	   well-­‐connected	  decision-­‐makers	  –	  which	  means	  in	  practice	  creating	  a	  fait	  
accompli.	   By	   contrast,	   an	   architect	   supervising	   the	   construction	  works	   for	   a	   boutique	   hotel	   managed	   by	   a	   wealthy	   but	   non-­‐crony	  investor	  describes	  how	  the	  local	  authorities	  delayed	  connecting	  his	  client	  to	  the	  public	  power	  and	  sewage	  grid	  for	  several	  years.	  Asked	  about	   the	   future	   course	   of	   action	   he	   clarifies:	   They	   do	   not	   start	  
before	   they	   get	   these	   facilities.	   So	   they	   are	   not	   going	   to	   open	  before	  
they	   get	   it.	   They	   cannot	   open.36	   This	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   ‘fait	  accompli	   strategy’	   only	   pays	   off	   for	   those	   close	   enough	   to	   the	  regime.	  For	   reasons	   of	   monument	   protection	   the	   local	   authorities	  banned	   the	   installation	   of	   central	   heating	   systems	   in	   traditional	  Damascene	   houses	   as	   the	   vibrations	   caused	   by	   diesel	   powered	  boilers	  put	  walls	  made	  of	  wood	  and	  clay	  in	   jeopardy.	  However,	  the	  owner	   of	   a	   guesthouse	   recalls	   everybody	   is	   violating	   this	   rule,37	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usually	  without	  being	  punished.	  Due	  to	  the	  informalization	  of	  rules	  well-­‐connected	   investors	   obtained	   ex	   post	   permissions	   despite	  violations	  of	  construction	  or	  license	  regulations	  and	  thus	  privileged	  access	   to	   business	   opportunities.	   So	   the	   [local]	   government	   found	  
itself	  eventually	   forced	  more	  or	   less	  to	   license	  those	  places.	   […]	  Their	  
existence	  became	  a	  reality.38	  	  In	   other	   cases	   investors	   put	   pressure	   on	   local	   authorities.	  One	  urban	   planner,	   who	   works	   in	   the	   public	   sector,	   describes	   his	  experiences	  dealing	  with	  members	  of	  the	  new	  bourgeoisie:	  Now,	  we	  have	  a	  big	  problem	  with	  this	  class	  […]	  because	  this	  kind	  of	   people	   doesn’t	   need	   to	   learn.	   And	   you	   cannot	   teach	   them	  anything	  because	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  have	  money...	  Big	  money…	  
Tammam	   [okay]?	   And	   they	   sometimes	   have	   authority;	   have	   a	  capacity,	  a	  big	  company	  working	  here	  in	  Syria	  or	  outside	  of	  Syria.	  What	  counts	  is	  “I	  can	  pay!”	  […].	  They	  –	  maybe	  –	  do	  not	  know	  any	  borders.	  Do	  you	  know,	  the	  money	  is	  sometimes	  blind.39	  Parts	  of	  the	  new	  bourgeoisie	  are	  bound	  to	  the	  regime	  by	  kinship	  or	  family	   ties,	   Rami	   Makhlouf,	   a	   cousin	   of	   Bashar	   al-­‐Asad,	   being	   the	  most	  prominent	  example.	  His	  diverse	  business	  activities	  include	  e.g.	  the	   country’s	   biggest	   mobile	   phone	   company,	   the	   country’s	   only	  private	   airline,	   construction	   firms,	   real	   estate,	   several	   restaurant	  chains	   and	   the	   touristic	   services	   provider	   Talisman	   Group,	   which	  runs	   two	   boutique	   hotels	   of	   the	   same	   name,	   both	   situated	   in	   Old	  Damascus.	   Other	  members	   of	   the	  Makhlouf	   family	   invested	   in	   the	  tourism	   industry,	   too:	   Khaldoun	   Makhlouf’s	   Julia	   Dumna	   Group	  which	   aims	   to	   be	   ‘the	   precious	   stone	   in	   the	   necklace	   of	   Syrian	  tourism	  services’,40	  has	  the	  monopoly	  for	  taxi	  travel	  from	  Damascus	  International	  Airport	  to	  the	  city	  centre	  and	  owns	  the	  boutique	  hotel	  Shahbandar	  Palace	  at	  the	  Eastern	  end	  of	  Qaymariya	  Street.	  The	  sons	  of	   Mustafa	   Tlas,	   the	   former	   Minister	   of	   Defence,	   have	   real-­‐estate	  interests	  and	  assets	  (e.g.	  Palmyra	  Real	  Estate)	  and	  also	  invested	  in	  a	  boutique	  hotel	  and	  restaurants	  (Ismail	  2009:	  19;	  Schmidt	  2009:	  29-­‐32;	  own	  internet	  searches).	  	  Between	  2006	  and	  2008	  a	  number	  of	  amendments	   to	   the	   legal	  framework	   for	   real	   estate	   investment	  have	  been	  made;41	  however,	  some	  aspects	  remain	  unregulated	  and	  favour	  practices	  Krijnen	  and	  Fawas	  labelled	  ‘exception	  as	  the	  rule’,	  including	  the	  informalization	  of	  urban	  policy,	  which	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  decision-­‐making	  ‘by	  mutual	  agreement,	   on	   an	   ad	   hoc	   basis,	   at	   multiple	   levels	   of	   the	   public	  hierarchies’	   (Krijnen	   and	   Fawas	   2010:	   245).	   Regarding	   real	   estate	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Picture 2.3: Construction site of the Holiday Inn Hotel on Thawra Street 
in direct proximity to the old city. 
 
Source: Photograph by Yannick Sudermann, 2010. 
Conclusion By	  facilitating	  upward	  social	  mobility	  alongside	  intense	  rural-­‐urban	  migration	  –	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  ascent	  of	  a	  new	  urban	  class	  -­‐	  the	  populist	  state	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  created	  the	  preconditions	  for	  gentrification	   in	   the	   country’s	   major	   cities:	   Among	   the	   “new	  urbanites”	  members	   of	   religious	  minorities	  were	   overrepresented,	  most	   prominently	   members	   of	   the	   formerly	   marginalized	   Alawite	  sect	   who	   initially	   gained	   political	   power	   through	   preferred	  recruitment	   into	   the	   Syrian	   military.	   Being	   the	   country’s	   new	  dominant	  political	  class	  and	  in	  order	  to	  legitimate	  the	  power	  gained	  since	   the	  Ba’th	   revolution,	   the	  newcomers	   strived	   for	   acquiring	   an	  urban	   as	   well	   as	   Damascene	   identity.	   This	   went	   along	   with	  displacing	   the	   old-­‐established	   predominantly	   Sunni	   urban	   elites.	  Though	   credited	   to	   economic	   imperatives	   from	   the	   late	   1970s	  onwards,	   it	   was	   the	   shift	   from	   populism	   towards	   post-­‐populism	  which,	   by	   reducing	   social	   benefits	   for	   the	   masses	   and	  simultaneously	  granting	  advantages	   to	   those	  closest	   to	   the	   regime,	  brought	   these	   individuals	   into	   the	  position	  of	   getting	  access	   to	   the	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very	  core	  of	  Damascus	  –	  the	  old	  city	  intra	  muros	  –	  which	  is	  now	  one	  of	  the	  city’s	  hot	  spots	  of	  gentrification.	  	  When	   the	   Syrian	   government	   eased	   previous	   restrictions	  regarding	  private	  investment	  in	  Old	  Damascene	  real	  estate	  selected	  producers	   of	   gentrification	   –	   especially	   those	   sympathetic	   to	   the	  regime	   –	   were	   able	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   investment	   in	   a	   profitable	  property	   market.	   For	   consumers	   of	   gentrified	   urban	   space	   the	  commodification	   of	   Old	   Damascus	   signifies	   the	   creation	   of	   both	   a	  consumable	  urban	  ‘leisure-­‐scape’	  and	  an	  arena	  for	  class	  distinction.	  Whether	   producers	   or	   consumers	   of	   gentrification,	   access	   to	   a	  gentrified	  Old	  Damascus	  has	  become	  an	  opportunity	  to	  acquire	  both	  an	   urban	   Damascene	   identity	   and	   prestige,	   particularly	   for	   non-­‐Damascene	   members	   of	   the	   new	   classes.	   Therefore,	   recent	   years	  have	   seen	   increasing	   numbers	   of	   stakeholders	   exploiting	   the	   old	  city’s	  urban	  heritage,	   thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  formerly	   neglected	   quarters	   into	   contested	   neighbourhoods.	  Accordingly,	   access	   to	   Old	   Damascus	   and	   its	   opening	   for	  gentrification	  has	  been	  providing	  the	  regime	  with	  manifold	  tools	  to	  co-­‐opt	  the	  new	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes:	  as	  shown	  above,	  granting	  licences	   (or	   declining	   to	   do	   so)	   for	   transforming	   residential	   into	  commercial	   property	   i.e.	   boutique	   hotels	   and	   restaurants;	   ex	   post	  permissions	   for	   previously	   illicitly	   commercialized	   residential	  property;	   or	   the	   selective	   provision	   of	   infrastructure	   facilities.	  Allowing	   foreign	   investment	   creates	   further	   potential	   earnings	   for	  well-­‐connected	  middle-­‐men.	   The	   creation	   of	   private	   sector	   jobs	   in	  both	   the	   production	   of	   a	   gentrified	   Old	   Damascus	   and	   in	   the	   new	  leisure	   industry	   attach	   many	   Syrians	   to	   the	   businesses	   of	   regime	  cronies	  and	  consequently	  to	  the	  regime.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  study	  of	  Qaymariya,	  one	  of	  Damascus’	  the	  historic	  neighbourhoods,	   this	   article	   revealed	   how	   gentrification	   to	   some	  extent	   enables	   authoritarian	   regimes	   to	   solidify	   their	   rule	   on	   the	  urban	  scale,	  thereby	  linking	  gentrification	  theory	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  authoritarian	  upgrading.	  It	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  regime,	  following	  its	   own	   (security)	   interests	   and	   despite	   increasing	   neoliberal	  influences,	   remains	   the	   only	   powerful	   player	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  granting	   or	   refusing	   access	   to	   gentrifying	   neighbourhoods.	   Adding	  to	   Hackworth’s	   definition	   of	   gentrification	   “authoritarian	  gentrification”	   is	   ‘the	   production	   of	   urban	   space	   for	   progressively	  more	  affluent	  users’	  (2002:	  815)	  by	  actors	  close	  to	  and	  approved	  by	  the	   regime.	   As	   was	   shown	   in	   this	   article	   gentrification	   has	   thus	  became	   a	   tool	   for	   authoritarian	   upgrading	   that	   is	   further	  characterized	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   legal	   certainty,	   the	   informalization	   of	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urban	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  provision	  of	  protection	  and	  privileges	  for	  loyal	   market	   participants	   through	   networks	   of	   clientelism	   and	  patronage.	  Since	  March	  2011	  when	  the	  current	  uprising	  against	  the	  al-­‐Asad	  regime	   gained	   momentum	   and	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   violent	  government	   crackdown	   on	   the	   opposition	   movement,	   Syria’s	  economy	   and	   a	   number	   of	   influential	   personalities	   close	   to	   the	  regime	   have	   been	   targeted	   by	   a	   set	   of	   international	   sanctions.	  Investors,	   international	   and	   Syrian	   alike,	   withdrew	   capital	   from	  previous	  investments	  in	  the	  country,	  meaning	  that	  the	  production	  of	  gentrification	  as	  investigated	  in	  this	  paper	  has	  largely	  come	  to	  a	  halt.	  However,	   the	   relative	   lack	   of	   enthusiam	   for	   the	   uprising	   and	   a	  looking	   the	   other	   way	   regarding	   regime	   repression	   of	   it	   by	  substantial	   fractions	   of	   the	   Damascene	   upper	   and	   middle	   classes	  convey	   the	   impression	   that	   strategies	   of	   co-­‐optation	   such	   as	   the	  creation	   of	   a	   gentrified	   Old	   Damascus	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   successful	  tools	  of	  authoritarian	  upgrading.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   “Five	   features	   stand	   out	   as	   defining	   elements	   of	   authoritarian	  	  upgrading.	  	  All	  	  of	  	  these	  	  elements	  	  are	  evident	  in	  varying	  combinations	  in	  major	  Arab	  states,	  including	  Algeria,	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  Morocco,	  Syria,	  Tunisia,	  and	   Yemen.	   	   Indeed,	   	   elements	   	   of	   	   these	   	   features	   are	   	   ubiquitous	  	  throughout	   	   the	  Arab	   	  world,	   	   although	   the	   	  particular	   	  mix	   	  differs	   	   from	  	  case	  	  to	  	  case.	   	  The	  	  five	  features	  are:	  1.	  Appropriating	  and	  containing	  civil	  societies;	   2.	  Managing	   political	   contestation;	   3.	   	   Capturing	   the	   benefits	   of	  selective	   economic	   	   reforms;	   4.	   Controlling	   new	   communications	  technologies;	  5.	  Diversifying	  international	  linkages”	  (Heydemann	  2007:	  5).	  	  2	   This	   paper	   is	   based	   on	   qualitative	   interviews	   with	   producers	   of	  gentrification	  and	  (former)	  residents	  conducted	  in	  spring	  2010	  and	  spring	  2011.	   In	   order	   to	   distinguish	   the	   participants	   and	   meanwhile	   granting	   a	  maximum	  of	  confidentiality	  only	  the	  month	  of	  the	  interview	  encounters	  are	  mentioned.	   The	   author	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   Tom	   Slater	   for	   feedback	   on	  earlier	   drafts.	   Fieldwork	   in	   spring	   2011	   would	   not	   have	   been	   possible	  without	  a	  grant	  from	  the	  Council	  for	  British	  Research	  in	  the	  Levant	  (CBRL)	  and	   the	   support	   of	   the	  Atelier	   du	   Vieux	   Damas	   at	   the	   Institut	   français	   du	  
Proche	  Orient	  (IfPO)	  in	  Damascus.	  3	  Translated	  from	  German	  Islamisch	  orientalische	  Stadt.	  4	  From	  German	  “Zurück-­‐in-­‐die-­‐Altstadt-­‐Bewegung”.	  5	  inter	  alia	  surveillance,	  clientelism	  and	  on	  occasion	  violence.	  6	  Author’s	  interview	  February	  2011.	  7	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  8	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  9	   http://damascus-­‐friends.com/friends-­‐of-­‐damascus-­‐32.damas,	   last	  accessed	  28.07.2011	  10	  http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/,	  last	  accessed	  28.07.2011	  11	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	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   12	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  13	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  14	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  15	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  16	  Author’s	  interviews	  in	  May	  2010	  and	  April	  2011.	  17	  Author’s	  interview	  May	  2010.	  18	  Author’s	  interviews	  April	  2011.	  19	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  20	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  21	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  22	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  23	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  24	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  25	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  26	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  27	  Author’s	  interview	  May	  2010.	  28	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  29	  However,	   it	   is	  not	  clear	   if	   this	  estimate	  remains	  realistic	  during	  the	  current	  government	  crackdown	  on	  the	  Syrian	  opposition	  movement.	  	  	  30	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  31	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  32	  When	  a	  family	  sees	  its	  neighbourhood	  changing	  dramatically,	  when	  all	  their	  friends	  are	  leaving,	  when	  stores	  are	  going	  out	  of	  business	  and	  new	  stores	   for	   other	   clientele	   are	   taking	   their	   place	   (or	   non	   at	   all	   replacing	  them),	   when	   changes	   in	   public	   transportation	   patterns,	   support	   services,	  are	  all	   clearly	  making	   the	  area	   less	  and	   less	   liveable,	   then	   the	  pressure	  of	  displacement	   is	   already	   severe,	   and	   its	   actuality	   only	   a	   matter	   of	   time.	  Families	  under	  such	  circumstances	  may	  even	  move	  as	  soon	  as	   they	  can…’	  (Markuse	  1986:	  157).	  33	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  34	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  35	   Regarding	   the	   differentiation	   between	   “old”	   and	   “new”	   bourgeoisie	  Perthes	   (1991:	   33)	  mentioned	   the	   year	   1963	   as	   dividing	   point.	  However,	  this	   distinction	   has	   become	   less	   important,	   as	   a	   certain	   amalgamation	   of	  formerly	   inimical	   elites	   took	   place	   due	   to	   economic	   liberalisation.	   Among	  Damascene	  elites,	  sharing	  a	  common	  lifestyle	  and	  level	  of	  wealth	  helped	  to	  overcome	   formerly	  dividing	  categories	   such	  as	   religion	  or	   regional	  origin.	  Inter-­‐marriages	   between	   members	   of	   the	   old	   and	   the	   new	   bourgeoisie	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  widespread	  than	  expected	  (Salamandra	  2004:	  53,	  70).	  36	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  37	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  38	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  39	  Author’s	  interview	  April	  2011.	  40	   http://www.arabianbusiness.com/power500/entry/385701	   (last	  accessed	  10.01.2012).	  41	  The	  Syria	  Report	  2009:	  Real	  Estate,	  pp.	  8-­‐9.	  	  42	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  important	  development	  projects	  in	  Syria	  see	  The	  Syria	  Report	  (2009:	  13-­‐20)	  and	  Oxford	  Business	  Group	  (2010:	  117).	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